South Korea. Japanese capital therefore focused more on
countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri
Lanka.
The importance of Thailand’s political stability
during this period must also be emphasized. Prime
Minister Prem Tinsulanonda was in power from March
1980 until July 1988. This was the longest parliamentary
premiership in Thai history, which gave an air of
continuity, robustness and stability rare in Thai politics.
Overall, during this period both the economic and
political situations changed radically. Thailand became
regarded as politically and economically stable and an
investment “hot spot.” Thailand was able to take
advantage of a clustering of favorable global, regional,
and national circumstances (Dixon 1999, 126-128).
Prime Minister Prem stepped down in July 1988 and
Chatichai Chunhavan became Prime Minister from then
until February 1991 when he was sacked in a coup
organized by General Suchinda Kraprayun.
With respect to economic planning, the
government abandoned policies to plan and control the
direction of economic growth. In 1988, the NESDB was
relieved of its role as supervisor of all major government
projects. The stated intention of the Sixth Plan was to
transform the role of the public sector into that of a
planner, supporter and facilitator of private sector
participation. The government would withdraw from
activities which could be carried out better and more
effectively by the private sector. In many respects, the
government reacted to the boom by retreating toward a
laissez-faire approach (Pasuk and Baker 2002, 161-162).
The Seventh Plan (1992-1996) was aimed at
fostering economic sustainability and sustainable
development; its broad objectives were balanced
economic growth; improved income distribution, human
resource development, and quality of life; and the
environment. During the early 1990s signs began to
emerge that, behind Thailand’s remarkable growth, a
series of long-term problems were emerging, such as
rising costs of production, lack of skilled labor,
overloaded infrastructure, congestion and pollution, the
opening of such low-cost locations as Vietnam and
China which would undermine Thailand’s comparative
advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing, inhibiting
the transition to more skill- and capital-intensive
activities (Dixon 1999, xi). The GDP growth rate, which
remained between 8 and 9 percent between 1992 and
1995, dropped to 5.9 percent in 1996. In 1996 there was
a sharp slowing of the rate of export growth, although
the impact of this on economic growth was masked by
rapid expansion of the property and financial sectors.
During this period, one of the major factors
affecting the Thai economy was the financial
liberalization over the years 1990 to 1993, and this was
linked to the second phase of the boom in the first half
of the 1990s.13 The liberalization coincided with a
critical period in the capital markets of the developed
world – both Europe and Japan suffered from low
domestic investment, high liquidity, and low interest
rates. Thus, money flooded into Thailand. In the early
1990s, total private inflows were running at 20 times the
level of the mid-1980s. In 1995 alone, more money
flowed in than over the entire decade of the 1980s. The
nature of money flows also differed. Instead of direct
investment, more funds came in as bank loans and
portfolio capital. Among others, these capital inflows
undermined export growth, fuelled a domestic market
boom, and created bubbles in asset markets. By the early
1990s the export boom had already begun to falter. A
growing current account deficit, labor shortages, and
infrastructure bottlenecks signaled a downturn in the
Thai economy.
In 1996 the Thai economy began to collapse. In
mid-1996, the collapse of the Bangkok Bank of
Commerce provided the starting signal. Meanwhile, the
property market topped out and began to crumble.
Construction slowed. After a decade of export growth at
around 20 percent a year, 1996 ended with zero growth.
The finance industry collapsed. In early 1997, Finance
One, one of the largest finance companies, folded. That
collapse and the attack of currency speculators on the
baht put the central bank into the awkward position of
trying to cope with the problem through the mobilization
of reserves and the Financial Institutions Development
Funds (FIDF). By mid-1997 Thailand’s foreign reserves
were exhausted. Eventually, Thailand was forced to call
on the IMF for help. On July 2, 1997, the baht was
floated and immediately began to slide downward
(Pasuk and Baker 2002, 174-175).
The Eighth Plan (1997-2001) started in the wake
of the financial crisis of mid-1997. The Plan, which had
been drawn up prior to the outbreak of the crisis, shifted
from growth orientation to people-centered
development: the well-being of the people was
considered to be the ultimate goal; economic growth was
viewed as a means to improve the people’s well-being
rather than as the final objective of development. The
planning process also shifted from a compartmentalized
to a more holistic approach, which enabled all
stakeholders in the society to participate in the national
development planning process. However, the Plan was
later revised, particularly with respect to its economic
targets and strategies, in order to cope with the problems
resulting from the crisis. The economic problems during
this critical period included insufficient international
reserves, the instability of the Thai baht, weakness in the
financial system, high levels of non-performing loans
(NPLs), high interest rates, high inflation, liquidity
shortage, large capital outflow, a dramatic contraction of
GDP, and a very high unemployment rate (NESDB
2003, 55). In late 1998, the proportion of NPLs rose to
47 percent of all credit in the financial system; interest
rates rose to around 19-20 percent annually; inflation
reached 9.2 percent; and the unemployment rate rose to
almost 5 percent.14 The financial crisis brought an abrupt
halt to Thailand’s decade of rapid growth. The economic
December 2004 TDRI Quarterly Review 11
growth rate became negative for the first time in 1997
with a GDP growth rate of –1.4 percent; it reached –10.5
percent in 1998. The economy began to recover in 1999
with real GDP growth of about 4.1 percent, led by the
manufacturing sector and increased domestic demand
boosted by several government stimulus packages.
Private consumption grew moderately, resulting in part
from rising consumer confidence and modestly
expanding farm income. Government stimulus measures,
which included reducing the value-added tax rate from
10 to 7 percent and cutting taxes on petroleum products,
also helped to boost private consumption. Tourism
increased by 10 percent from 1998, partly as a result of
the lower exchange rate, with the number of tourists
reaching 8.5 million in 1999. The private investment
index declined moderately in 1999, compared with its
steep decline in 1998.
The Ninth Plan (2002-2006) was formulated
based somewhat on the nightmare of the 1997 crisis. The
Plan has adopted the philosophy of a sufficiency
economy, a remarkable teaching of the King, which
stresses the middle path, moderation, and due
consideration, in all manner of conduct, as the guiding
framework for national development. The Plan has also
been built on the Eighth Plan’s advocacy of holistic
people-centered development (NESDB 2003, 51).
CONCLUSION
During the past 20 years, Thailand has undergone
remarkable changes. At the beginning of that period, it
seemed that Thailand could be characterized by
remarkably uneven patterns of development, an unusual,
non-colonial mode of incorporation into the global
economy, and generally limited appeal to transnational
corporations and foreign investors. The economic and
political uncertainty that characterized Thailand during
the early 1980s resulted in limited success in formal
structural adjustments; imbalanced sectoral employment,
particularly in the agricultural sector; low levels of
urbanization; concentration of the population and
modern activities in the Bangkok Metropolitan area;
rural-urban development and income gaps; and
underdevelopment of education and training.
Nevertheless, during the late 1980s, Thailand
began to experience a period of growth and structural
change, and became a regional investment ‘hot spot,’
particularly for labor-intensive manufacturing activities
decanting from Japan and the Asian NIEs in search of
lower-cost locations. In fact, over the last 30 years
Thailand has experienced high and consistent rates of
growth. Despite the various political and economic
issues that remain, the Kingdom has shown great
resilience in the face of both internal and external
disruptions.
Yet, during the early 1990s signs began to
emerge that, behind Thailand’s remarkable growth, a
series of long-term problems were eme