Despite equal rights policies, people from racial minorities still face many disadvantages. For example, studies have shown that Black employees receive lower wages than their White counterparts (Johnston & Lordan, 2014), that students of racial minorities are more likely than White students to be suspended from schools (Rich, 2014), and that Black NBA players are more often penalized for personal fouls than White players when the referee is White (Price & Wolfers, 2010). A recent field experiment on the U.S. job market found that résumés with White-sounding names such as Emily Walsh received 50% more call-backs than those with Black-sounding names such as Lakisha Washington (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004).
Racial discrimination is often unintended, and partially stems from automatic psychological processes. Many studies have looked at strategies to overcome or mitigate racial discrimination. A common finding in these studies is that people can successfully control discrimination when they exert conscious effort to limit the effects of biases on their judgments (Devine, 1989 and Payne, 2005). For example, instructions to engage in mental perspective taking (i.e., to imagine oneself in the other person’s shoes) help judges and jurors to diminish stereotyping and in-group favoritism (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Adopting implementation intentions to control for potential bias in specific contexts (e.g., making if–then plans such as “if I encounter a Black person, then I think counter-stereotypic thoughts”) has also been found effective (Mendoza et al., 2010 and Stewart and Payne, 2008). However, conscious strategies to counteract bias can also, in fact, increase race bias. For instance, instructions to suppress stereotypes (e.g., “try to be color blind”) have been shown to produce a rebound effect that increases race bias ( Apfelbaum et al., 2008 and Macrae et al., 1994).
In the present research we highlight another potential problem of conscious thought as a bias-reducing strategy. We propose that conscious thought increases the likelihood of biased memory representations of Black and White people, increasing, in turn, the likelihood of biased evaluations. This idea is based on the notion that conscious thought strengthens the activation of automatically activated cognitive schemata (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006 and Strack and Deutsch, 2004, see also Bos and Dijksterhuis, 2011, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006 and Reinhard et al., 2013). Several lines of research indicate that conscious thought often supports or even intensifies the impact of automatically activated schemata on judgments, especially when information is ambiguous or complex. For example, research on the Heuristic Systematic Model showed that the valence of effortful systematic processing can be biased by heuristic cues present in ambiguous persuasive messages (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; see also Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). Pelham and Neter (1995) found that a higher level of motivation – a condition under which people generally apply more conscious thought (e.g., Baumeister, 1984) – increased the use of erroneous heuristic cues in problem solving. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that conscious thought sustains the activation of automatically activated race categories, thereby bolstering the structuring of information in memory around race categories.
Research illustrates that the salience of race categories, in turn, increases the likelihood of stereotyping and racially biased judgments. For example, Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) demonstrated that negative automatic evaluations toward Black people are stronger when participants focus their attention on race categories than when they pay attention to another social category (see also Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997). Payne, Lambert, and Jacoby (2002) showed that drawing attention to race categories increases stereotypical errors in a speeded weapon identification task compared to a control condition where race was not emphasized. The mechanism underlying these effects is that drawing participants’ attention to category membership activates automatic evaluations associated with these categories, which in turn influences evaluative judgments and decisions. Given that automatic evaluations of Black people tend to be more negative than those of White people, this results in judgments favoring Whites over Blacks.
There is preliminary evidence that conscious thought increases stereotyping and judgment bias. Several studies on Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, for a review see Strick et al., 2011) showed that participants stereotyped more after a period of conscious thought than after a period of distraction (or “unconscious thought”). Bos and Dijksterhuis (2011) presented participants with a person of an ethnic minority group and found that a period of conscious thought, compared to a period of unconscious thought, led to lower accessibility and poorer memory for stereotype-incongruent information, indicating more stereotyping. Messner, Wänke, and Weibel (2011) showed that a period of conscious thought, compared to a period of unconscious thought, led to objectively poorer decisions in a personnel selection context (i.e., they selected less qualified candidates in terms of the number of fulfilled job requirements) when two cues that often bias personnel selection (gender and attractiveness differences) were present. Furthermore, conscious thinkers had a stronger tendency to prefer males to females (i.e., display gender bias) than unconscious thinkers.
The present studies extend previous research in several ways. Whereas Bos and Dijksterhuis (2011) investigated how conscious thought affects memory representations, the present research went on to investigate how conscious thought affects racial prejudice, that is, evaluative judgments about people from a different race. Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies (i.e., Bos and Dijksterhuis, 2011 and Messner et al., 2011), we included a control condition in which participants were given no time to think at all (either consciously or unconsciously). This way we can test whether unconscious thought has benefits above and beyond not just conscious thought, but also simply “not thinking at all”. Furthermore, we introduce two novel methods to measure racially biased memory representations.
The task used in Experiments 1 and 2 was the “Who is Who?” task. It was inspired by the “Who said what?” paradigm (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), a task that uses memory confusion to discover the extent to which participants categorize target persons into social categories. In our version of the task, participants form impressions of four candidate housemates, two White and two Black. Each housemate is presented with a name, a face, and a number of descriptive verbal attributes. After the manipulation of immediate decision making or decision-making after conscious or unconscious thought (see below), participants are again presented with the names of the candidates and they are asked to attribute each name to the correct face, each time choosing among three White and three Black faces (the correct face and five incorrect faces). Participants’ mistakes reveal to what extent they had categorized the candidates in terms of race. Participants are more likely to misattribute a candidate’s name to another same-race face if they had remembered him as a member of that race group in the first place (Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991). Hence, biased memory is indicated by a higher proportion of “same-race errors” compared to “different-race errors”.
We used another new paradigm in Experiment 3. In this paradigm, participants saw the face of a Black male, after which their likelihood to remember him as darker (more information follows) was assessed. Thus, instead of investigating the tendency to remember a person as belonging to the White or Black race category (as in Experiments 1 and 2), Experiment 3 investigated the tendency to remember a person as more or less typical of the Black race category. This tendency is important to study in its own right because a broad literature indicates that when individuals are perceived as more typical of the Black race they are more likely to be judged according to the negative stereotypes and evaluations associated with the Black race category, an effect sometimes dubbed skin tone bias ( Maddox & Gray, 2002). A research review indicated that individuals whose features are typical of the Black race generally suffer from lower social status and health compared to their less-prototypical counterparts ( Maddox, 2004). As far as we know, this is the first research that tests the hypothesis that conscious thought increases the tendency to remember Black faces as more typical of their category.
The procedure of the experiments was typical for studies on UTT. In the first two experiments, participants were presented with four candidate housemates (two White, two Black), and were asked to form impressions of them. The candidates had an individual name, were described by 12 attributes each (making the decision a complex one), and a picture revealing the candidate’s race. Participants in the conscious thought condition were allowed to think about their evaluative judgments of the candidates for 3 min, while participants in the unconscious thought condition were distracted by an unrelated task for 3 min before making their judgments. Experiment 1 also included an immediate decision condition, in which participants were given no time to think at all. As racial bias is usually stronger under conditions of limited time or cognitive capacity (e.g., Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001), we expected racial bias to be strong among immediate decision makers. In Experiment 3, one Black person was presented, after which participants thought about him consciously or
แม้ มีสิทธิที่เท่าเทียมกันนโยบาย คนจากเชื้อชาติคมิยังคงหน้าเสียมาก ตัวอย่าง การศึกษาได้แสดงว่า พนักงานที่ดำได้รับค่าจ้างต่ำกว่าคู่ของพวกเขาสีขาว (จอห์นสตันและ Lordan, 2014), ที่นักเรียนเชื้อชาติคมิยิ่งกว่านักเรียนสีขาวถูกหยุดชั่วคราวจากโรงเรียน (Rich, 2014), และว่า ผู้เล่นเอ็นบีเอสีดำมีบ่อยสำเร็จสำหรับบุคคล fouls กว่าเล่นขาวเมื่อชก ขาว (ราคาและ Wolfers, 2010) การทดลองฟิลด์ล่าสุดในตลาดงานสหรัฐพบประวัติที่ มีชื่อสีขาวหูเป็น Emily วอล์ชได้รับ 50% ขึ้นไปโทรกลับมากกว่าผู้ที่มีหูสีดำชื่อเช่น Lakisha วอชิงตัน (เบอร์ & Mullainathan, 2004)แบ่งแยกเชื้อชาติมักจะไม่ได้ตั้งใจ และบางส่วนเกิดจากกระบวนการทางจิตวิทยาโดยอัตโนมัติ การศึกษามากได้ดูที่กลยุทธ์เพื่อเอาชนะ หรือบรรเทาการแบ่งแยกเชื้อชาติ ค้นหาทั่วไปในการศึกษานี้คือ ว่า คนสำเร็จได้แบ่งแยกเมื่อพวกเขาออกแรงความพยายามมีสติเพื่อจำกัดผลกระทบของการยอมในการพิพากษา (Devine, 1989 และ Payne, 2005) ตัวอย่าง คำแนะนำในการมุมมองทางจิต (เช่น ภาพตัวเองในรองเท้าของคนอื่น) ช่วยผู้พิพากษาและ jurors หรี่ทัศนคติทั่วไปต่อและ in-group พรรค (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) ใช้ความตั้งใจดำเนินงานเพื่อควบคุมความโน้มเอียงเป็นไปได้ในบริบทที่เฉพาะ (เช่น ถ้าแล้วทำแผนเช่น "เมื่อพบคนดำ แล้วคิดคิดทวน stereotypic") นอกจากนี้ยังพบมีประสิทธิภาพ (al. et เมนโดซา 2010 และสจ๊วต และ Payne, 2008) อย่างไรก็ตาม กลยุทธ์สติเพื่อถอนอคติยังสามารถ ในความเป็นจริง เพิ่มความโน้มเอียงในการแข่งขัน ตัวอย่าง คำแนะนำเพื่อระงับ (เช่น, "พยายามที่จะตาบอดสี") มักมีการแสดงการผลิตผลตอบสนองที่เพิ่มความโน้มเอียงของการแข่งขัน (Apfelbaum et al., 2008 และ Macrae et al., 1994)งานวิจัยปัจจุบัน เราเน้นปัญหาอื่นอาจมีสติคิดเป็นกลยุทธ์การลดอคติ เราเสนอว่า สติคิดเพิ่มโอกาสของคนขาวดำ เพิ่มขึ้น จะ ความเป็นไปได้ของการประเมิน biased แทนหน่วยความจำ biased ความคิดนี้เป็นไปตามความคิดสติเพิ่มความแข็งแกร่ง schemata รับรู้โดยอัตโนมัติเปิดใช้งานการเรียกใช้ (Gawronski และ Bodenhausen, 2006 และ Strack และ Deutsch, 2004 ดู Dijksterhuis และบอส 2011, Dijksterhuis และ Nordgren, 2006 และ Reinhard et al., 2013) ของงานวิจัยบ่งชี้ว่า สติคิดมักจะสนับสนุน หรือแม้แต่มากขึ้น intensifies ผลกระทบของ schemata เปิดโดยอัตโนมัติในคำพิพากษา โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งเมื่อข้อมูลกำกวม หรือซับซ้อนกัน ตัวอย่าง งานวิจัยในรูปแบบระบบ Heuristic แสดงให้เห็นว่า สามารถลำเอียงเวเลนซ์ของการประมวลผลระบบ effortful ด้วยแล้วสัญลักษณ์ที่ปรากฏในข้อความที่ persuasive กำกวม (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994 ดู Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997) เพลแฮมและ Neter (1995) พบว่า แรงจูงใจ – ในระดับที่สูงขึ้นเงื่อนไขภายใต้ที่คนทั่วไปใช้สติคิด (เช่น Baumeister, 1984) – เพิ่ม heuristic พลาดการใช้สัญลักษณ์ในการแก้ปัญหา ขึ้นอยู่กับผลการวิจัยเหล่านี้ เรา hypothesize ที่คิดใส่ใจได้รับคำสั่งการเรียกใช้โดยอัตโนมัติเปิดแข่งขันประเภท จึงประคบประหงมจัดโครงสร้างของข้อมูลในหน่วยความจำรอบแข่งขันประเภทงานวิจัยแสดงว่า salience ของประเภทการแข่งขัน ใช้ เพิ่มโอกาสตัดสินทัศนคติทั่วไปต่อ และ racially biased ตัวอย่าง Mitchell, Nosek และ Banaji (2003) แสดงให้เห็นว่าประเมินค่าลบโดยอัตโนมัติไปยังคนแข็งแกร่งเมื่อผู้เรียนมุ่งเน้นความสนใจประเภทแข่งขันกว่าเมื่อพวกเขาใส่ใจสังคมประเภทอื่น (ดู Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne ทอร์น และ Castelli, 1997) Payne, Lambert ก Jacoby (2002) พบว่า ดึงดูดความสนใจกับการแข่งขันประเภทเพิ่ม stereotypical ข้อผิดพลาดในงานรหัสอาวุธ speeded เปรียบเทียบกับเงื่อนไขควบคุมที่แข่งขันไม่ได้เน้น กลไกต้นลักษณะพิเศษเหล่านี้ได้ให้ความสนใจวาดร่วมกับสมาชิกประเภทเรียกประเมินอัตโนมัติที่เกี่ยวข้องกับประเภทเหล่านี้ ซึ่งจะมีผลต่อคำพิพากษา evaluative และตัดสินใจ ระบุว่าประเมินโดยอัตโนมัติของคนมักจะ เป็นค่าลบมากขึ้นกว่าคนสีขาว ซึ่งผลตัดสินนความขาวมากกว่าดำThere is preliminary evidence that conscious thought increases stereotyping and judgment bias. Several studies on Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, for a review see Strick et al., 2011) showed that participants stereotyped more after a period of conscious thought than after a period of distraction (or “unconscious thought”). Bos and Dijksterhuis (2011) presented participants with a person of an ethnic minority group and found that a period of conscious thought, compared to a period of unconscious thought, led to lower accessibility and poorer memory for stereotype-incongruent information, indicating more stereotyping. Messner, Wänke, and Weibel (2011) showed that a period of conscious thought, compared to a period of unconscious thought, led to objectively poorer decisions in a personnel selection context (i.e., they selected less qualified candidates in terms of the number of fulfilled job requirements) when two cues that often bias personnel selection (gender and attractiveness differences) were present. Furthermore, conscious thinkers had a stronger tendency to prefer males to females (i.e., display gender bias) than unconscious thinkers.The present studies extend previous research in several ways. Whereas Bos and Dijksterhuis (2011) investigated how conscious thought affects memory representations, the present research went on to investigate how conscious thought affects racial prejudice, that is, evaluative judgments about people from a different race. Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies (i.e., Bos and Dijksterhuis, 2011 and Messner et al., 2011), we included a control condition in which participants were given no time to think at all (either consciously or unconsciously). This way we can test whether unconscious thought has benefits above and beyond not just conscious thought, but also simply “not thinking at all”. Furthermore, we introduce two novel methods to measure racially biased memory representations.
The task used in Experiments 1 and 2 was the “Who is Who?” task. It was inspired by the “Who said what?” paradigm (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), a task that uses memory confusion to discover the extent to which participants categorize target persons into social categories. In our version of the task, participants form impressions of four candidate housemates, two White and two Black. Each housemate is presented with a name, a face, and a number of descriptive verbal attributes. After the manipulation of immediate decision making or decision-making after conscious or unconscious thought (see below), participants are again presented with the names of the candidates and they are asked to attribute each name to the correct face, each time choosing among three White and three Black faces (the correct face and five incorrect faces). Participants’ mistakes reveal to what extent they had categorized the candidates in terms of race. Participants are more likely to misattribute a candidate’s name to another same-race face if they had remembered him as a member of that race group in the first place (Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991). Hence, biased memory is indicated by a higher proportion of “same-race errors” compared to “different-race errors”.
We used another new paradigm in Experiment 3. In this paradigm, participants saw the face of a Black male, after which their likelihood to remember him as darker (more information follows) was assessed. Thus, instead of investigating the tendency to remember a person as belonging to the White or Black race category (as in Experiments 1 and 2), Experiment 3 investigated the tendency to remember a person as more or less typical of the Black race category. This tendency is important to study in its own right because a broad literature indicates that when individuals are perceived as more typical of the Black race they are more likely to be judged according to the negative stereotypes and evaluations associated with the Black race category, an effect sometimes dubbed skin tone bias ( Maddox & Gray, 2002). A research review indicated that individuals whose features are typical of the Black race generally suffer from lower social status and health compared to their less-prototypical counterparts ( Maddox, 2004). As far as we know, this is the first research that tests the hypothesis that conscious thought increases the tendency to remember Black faces as more typical of their category.
The procedure of the experiments was typical for studies on UTT. In the first two experiments, participants were presented with four candidate housemates (two White, two Black), and were asked to form impressions of them. The candidates had an individual name, were described by 12 attributes each (making the decision a complex one), and a picture revealing the candidate’s race. Participants in the conscious thought condition were allowed to think about their evaluative judgments of the candidates for 3 min, while participants in the unconscious thought condition were distracted by an unrelated task for 3 min before making their judgments. Experiment 1 also included an immediate decision condition, in which participants were given no time to think at all. As racial bias is usually stronger under conditions of limited time or cognitive capacity (e.g., Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001), we expected racial bias to be strong among immediate decision makers. In Experiment 3, one Black person was presented, after which participants thought about him consciously or
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