Studies of earnings management typically consider a specific incentive for earnings management (e.g. incentives related to executive bonus plans) and then test whether earnings have been managed assuming a particular earnings management method (e.g. management of accruals). 12 In contrast,the crosssectional approach employed here allows us to identify a large set of potential earnings manipulators before invoking specific assumptions about earnings management motivation or methods. Consequently, we can use information about the prevalence of earnings management near zero changes and levels of earnings to explore how earnings are managed and assess the relative impor tance of potential earnings management methods. In this section, we focus on avoidance of losses because the evidence in Section 2 shows a more concen trated effect for management to avoid losses than for management to avoid earnings decreases. Nonetheless, a similar methodology could be used to explore earnings management to avoid earnings decreases.
We present two types of evidence, ex ante and ex post, about the manipulation of earnings to avoid losses. The first type of evidence is related to the ex ante costs of earnings management. Holding the benefits of earnings management to avoid losses constant, we conjecture that the extent of earnings management is likely to be a function of the ex ante costs of earnings management. In other words, earnings manipulators are likely to be firms which faced relatively lower ex ante costs of earnings management. Therefore, given that earnings manipulators moved from slightly negative earnings to slightly positive earnings, firms with slightly negative earnings likely are those which faced higher ex ante earnings management costs than firms with slightly positive earnings.
Studies of earnings management typically consider a specific incentive for earnings management (e.g. incentives related to executive bonus plans) and then test whether earnings have been managed assuming a particular earnings management method (e.g. management of accruals). 12 In contrast,the crosssectional approach employed here allows us to identify a large set of potential earnings manipulators before invoking specific assumptions about earnings management motivation or methods. Consequently, we can use information about the prevalence of earnings management near zero changes and levels of earnings to explore how earnings are managed and assess the relative impor tance of potential earnings management methods. In this section, we focus on avoidance of losses because the evidence in Section 2 shows a more concen trated effect for management to avoid losses than for management to avoid earnings decreases. Nonetheless, a similar methodology could be used to explore earnings management to avoid earnings decreases.
We present two types of evidence, ex ante and ex post, about the manipulation of earnings to avoid losses. The first type of evidence is related to the ex ante costs of earnings management. Holding the benefits of earnings management to avoid losses constant, we conjecture that the extent of earnings management is likely to be a function of the ex ante costs of earnings management. In other words, earnings manipulators are likely to be firms which faced relatively lower ex ante costs of earnings management. Therefore, given that earnings manipulators moved from slightly negative earnings to slightly positive earnings, firms with slightly negative earnings likely are those which faced higher ex ante earnings management costs than firms with slightly positive earnings.
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