Procedurally, hard law constrains the techniques of dispute settlement and negotiation.
Even when delegation is relatively low, legalization implies that most disputes and questions of interpretation should be addressed through specialized procedures,
operated primarily by legal professionals using professional modes of discourse.
Even when directly negotiated solutions are permitted, the existence of legal institutions
means that states will bargain ‘‘in the shadow’’ of anticipated legal decisions.
When legal rules are in effect, moreover, unauthorizedcoercive behavioris generally
seen as illegitimate. It is no coincidence that legalization in the WTO was explicitly
tied to a requirement that member states resolve their trade disputesthrough the new
dispute settlement procedures, not through unilateral determinationsand responses—a
provision aimed directly at the coercive tactics of the United States under Section
301. Even hard international law is not foolproof, of course; the principles discussed
here may be ignored in practice, especially by powerful states. Nonetheless, on the
whole legalization remains an effective device for organizing ongoing interactions