In reality, Chatichai did not abandon the traditional bending-with-the-wind strategy, even when a new definition of national interests was introduced. Thailand under his premiership apparently blended itself with the new international order in which economic diplomacy super¬seded guns and bullets. Chatichai concentrated mostly on taking full advantage from globalization to revitalize the Thai economy, opening the country for foreign investment and tourists and finding new niche markets for Thai exports, a direction that had been closely followed by his successors, including billionaire Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-6). But his shift of foreign-policy focus was perceived as too radical and a threat to the power of the military and bureaucracy. In 1991, the army staged a coup against the Chatichai administration. Yet, the military won only a pyrrhic victory. Chatichai’s marketplace policy, anticipating many new business opportunities in post-civil war Cambodia, proved that Thailand was on the right track and that the military was behind the times and out of touch of the reality of regional politics. When Thaksin later followed in the footsteps of Chatichai, he, too, was ousted in the military coup of 2006. The elusiveness of unlocking the traditional mode of thinking about foreign policy amongst the Thai elite, to a certain extent, represents a major hindrance to the work of Thai diplomacy.
In the context of Thailand’s Great Powers politics, it is only relevant to focus the attention on the role of China, the only Great Power in the region supposedly capable of contesting United States influence on Thailand’s foreign affairs. China epitomizes the most commensurate contender to face United States supremacy since both Powers have been competing to win Thailand’s alliance, willing to invest resources, and perfecting strategies to accomplish their goals. So far, European Great Powers have exercised little leverage in the way Thai diplomacy has been conducted. In fact, their role in Thailand’s foreign affairs has plunged into obscurity since the end of the colonial period. Likewise, certain obstacles delay the improvement of bilateral relations between Thailand and Russia, including the lack of a real interest, and perhaps capability, on the part of Moscow to venture beyond its immediate Asian frontier. In other words, Russia has given