Conclusion
Starting with the second quarter of 1996, the SEC requires all public firms to file their 10-
Q and the 10-K reports electronically. This requirement makes it possible to use an algorithm
to detect the quarter in which firms report a violation. These data have been collected
and made available publically by Nini et al. (2011).
I use this quarterly data set and conduct a large sample study to examine the earnings
management patterns around debt-covenant violations. My study shows that in general
managers manipulate earnings upward in quarters leading up to a violation, but downward
in the quarter with the violation, and while the firm remains in violation. Because of the
data limitation, prior studies have not been able to make such a fine partition to understand
exactly how managers manage earnings around covenant violations. By documenting the
conflicting directions of earnings management that can occur in different quarters in the
year with a violation, my research shows that the use of yearly data to examine the earnings
management around covenant violations is problematic.
While the results are consistent with the debt-covenant hypothesis, further analysis
shows that in the previolation periods managers not only think about avoiding a violation;
but also take into consideration the possibility of successfully staving off the violation, and
their bargaining position should they fail to stave off the violation. For example, severely
distressed firms manage earnings downward in previolation quarters.
Once a violation occurs, earnings management done to improve bargaining positions
becomes even starker. I find that the kind of renegotiation that is likely to occur affects the
earnings management strategy: Firms in a good position manage earnings upward while in
violation to project a healthy image when expecting a waiver, while financially distressed
firms manage earnings downward during these quarters. While the earnings management
before a violation has been extensively studied, to my knowledge, the earnings management
in the quarter with a violation and the period in which firms remain in violation has
not been examined before.
I also address the conflicting, but empirically untested, assertion on how high-debt firms
manage earnings prior to a covenant violation. I find that high-debt firms do not manage
earnings excessively before a violation. Instead, apparently, high debt induces higher creditor
scrutiny and restrains upward earnings management.
Furthermore, consistent with the idea that SOX has restrained managers from using accruals
to manage earnings, my results show that after SOX, managers have restrained themselves
from using accruals to manipulate earnings even when it is to avoid a covenant violation.
Overall, by making use of a comprehensive quarterly database on covenant violation,
conducting precise tests, and seeking answers to questions that have been raised but never