The hypothesis that the Bretton Woods system was dynamically unstable was
mooted by Robert Triffin as early as 1947. Triffin focused on what he saw as
inevitable changes in the composition of reserves, arguing that the system’s viability
hinged on the willingness of foreign governments to accumulate dollars, which
depended in turn on confidence in the maintenance of dollar convertibility. Although
gold dominated the dollar as a source of international liquidity (in 1958 the value
of gold reserves was four times the value of dollar reserves when all countries
were considered, two times when the United States was excluded), dollars were
the main source of liquidity on the margin. Yet the willingness of foreign
governments to accumulate dollars at the required pace and hence the stability of
the gold-dollar system were predicated on America’s commitment and capacity
to maintain the convertibility of dollars into gold at $35 an ounce. The threat to
its ability to do so was that, under a system in which reserves could take the form
of either dollars or gold (a scarce natural resource whose supply was insufficiently
elastic to keep pace with the demand for liquidity), the share of dollars in total
reserves could only increase. An ever-growing volume of foreign dollar liabilities
was based on a fixed or even shrinking U.S. gold reserve. Thus the very structure
of Bretton Woods—specifically, the monetary role for gold—progressively
undermined the hegemon’s capacity to ensure the system’s smooth operation through
the provision of adequate liquidity.
The hypothesis that the Bretton Woods system was dynamically unstable wasmooted by Robert Triffin as early as 1947. Triffin focused on what he saw asinevitable changes in the composition of reserves, arguing that the system’s viabilityhinged on the willingness of foreign governments to accumulate dollars, whichdepended in turn on confidence in the maintenance of dollar convertibility. Althoughgold dominated the dollar as a source of international liquidity (in 1958 the valueof gold reserves was four times the value of dollar reserves when all countrieswere considered, two times when the United States was excluded), dollars werethe main source of liquidity on the margin. Yet the willingness of foreigngovernments to accumulate dollars at the required pace and hence the stability ofthe gold-dollar system were predicated on America’s commitment and capacityto maintain the convertibility of dollars into gold at $35 an ounce. The threat toits ability to do so was that, under a system in which reserves could take the formof either dollars or gold (a scarce natural resource whose supply was insufficientlyelastic to keep pace with the demand for liquidity), the share of dollars in totalreserves could only increase. An ever-growing volume of foreign dollar liabilitieswas based on a fixed or even shrinking U.S. gold reserve. Thus the very structureof Bretton Woods—specifically, the monetary role for gold—progressivelyundermined the hegemon’s capacity to ensure the system’s smooth operation throughthe provision of adequate liquidity.
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