• The risk appetite of banks. Rather than using the boom period prior to the crisis to build up
their reserves, banks increased their risk exposure, as evidenced by the higher debt to equity
ratios (financial leverage), despite many banks knowing the bubble was soon to burst.
• The frequency of destructive scandals in the US. Enron was overshadowed by WorldCom,
and WorldCom has now been overshadowed by the subprime crisis.
• The profit motive in the US and what gets swept aside in its wake.
• The poor corporate governance track record in the US.
• The loss of financial stability and loss of public confidence in the financial system.
• The need for the taxpayer to bail out banks whose executives had received very substantial
salaries, bonuses, shares and pension arrangements. There was (and continues to be) no
clear rhyme or reason as to the way banks compensated their employees. Despite claims
to the contrary, examination of past events clearly illustrates bonuses were not linked to
performance.15
• The view of executives who thought they faced no moral hazard. In a market economy it
is vital that businesses should be able to fail. Without the knowledge that mismanagement
can lead to failure, executive management face no moral hazard. If risks may be taken for
short-term gain, secure in the knowledge that the public sector will step in to rescue the
business if it runs into trouble, there is an unacceptable mismatch between the risk and
reward faced by the institution and by the taxpayer.
• The incentivising of senior managers and its damaging effect on long-term business success.
In businesses such as investment banking, it is now widely accepted that there is further
moral hazard16 from very high-risk strategies, where bonuses in the good times are so high
that executives can afford to walk away in the event that the entire business is destroyed.
Lehman Brothers is a case in point