Kant’s claim that first entry cannot be denied to those
who seek it if this would result in their “destruction” (Untergang)
has become incorporated into the Geneva Convention
on the Status ofRefugees as the principle of “non-refoulement”
(United Nations 1951). This principle obliges signatory states
not toforcibly returnrefugeesandasylum seekers totheir countries
of origin if doing sowould pose a clear danger to their lives
and freedom. Of course, just as sovereign states can manipulate
this article to define life and freedom more or less narrowly
when it fits their purposes, it is also possible to circumvent the
“non-refoulement” clause by depositing refugees and asylees in
so-called safe third countries. Kant’s formulations clearly foresawaswell
as justified such balancing acts as between the moral
obligations of states to those who seek refuge in their midst and to their own welfare and interests. The lexical ordering of the
two claims – the moral needs of others versus legitimate selfinterest
– is vague, except in the most obvious cases when the
life and limb of refugeeswould be endangered by denying them
the right of entry; apart from such cases, however, the obligation
to respect the liberty and welfare of the guest can permit
a narrow interpretation on the part of the sovereign to whom
it is addressed, and need not be considered an unconditional
duty.