Much attention has been given in the Public Choice field to the problem of voting. The simple approaches currently used have been shown to be defective as they do not always achieve the desired results. Alternative voting methods are examined and evaluated. Unfortunately, it has been difficult to modify our voting methods to reflect this knowledge.
A surprizing conclusion of Public Choice theory is that it is rational to not concern yourself with the issues or to bother to vote. I quote Jane S. Shaw from her article, "Public Choice Theory":
One of the chief underpinnings of public choice theory is the lack of incentives for voters to monitor government effectively. Anthony Downs, in one of the earliest public choice books, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (PDF version online here) pointed out that the voter is largely ignorant of political issues and that this ignorance is rational. Even though the result of an election may be very important, an individual's vote rarely decides an election. Thus, the direct impact of casting a well-informed vote is almost nil; the voter has virtually no chance to determine the outcome of the election. So spending time following the issues is not personally worthwhile for the voter. Evidence for this claim is found in the fact that public opinion polls consistently find that less than half of all voting-age Americans can name their own congressional representative.