WHEN IS REPRESENTATION “DEMOCRATIC”?
If democratic representation is to be understood as more than a division of labor between political elites and citizens, we need to understand representation as an intrinsic part of what makes democracy possible. To do so, we must distinguish between generic norms of democracy and the institutions and practices through which the norms are realized. Much democratic theory has moved in this direction, conceiving democracy as any set of arrangements that instantiates the principle that all affected by collective decisions should have an opportunity to influence the outcome (see, e.g., Habermas 1996, p. 107; Dahl 1998, pp. 37–38; Held 1996, p. 324; Young 2000, p. 23; Gould 2004, pp. 175–78). Although there are important variations in the normative presuppositions embedded in this principle, most democratic theorists hold that (a) individuals are morally and legally equal and (b) individuals are equally capable of autonomy with respect to citizenship—that is, conscious self-determination—all other things begin equal. It follows that collective decisions affecting self-determination should include those affected.
WHEN IS REPRESENTATION “DEMOCRATIC”?If democratic representation is to be understood as more than a division of labor between political elites and citizens, we need to understand representation as an intrinsic part of what makes democracy possible. To do so, we must distinguish between generic norms of democracy and the institutions and practices through which the norms are realized. Much democratic theory has moved in this direction, conceiving democracy as any set of arrangements that instantiates the principle that all affected by collective decisions should have an opportunity to influence the outcome (see, e.g., Habermas 1996, p. 107; Dahl 1998, pp. 37–38; Held 1996, p. 324; Young 2000, p. 23; Gould 2004, pp. 175–78). Although there are important variations in the normative presuppositions embedded in this principle, most democratic theorists hold that (a) individuals are morally and legally equal and (b) individuals are equally capable of autonomy with respect to citizenship—that is, conscious self-determination—all other things begin equal. It follows that collective decisions affecting self-determination should include those affected.
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