In August of 2011, I flew to Japan along with six members of my Cabinet and Marvic Leonen, who was then chair of the government peace panel, to meet with our brothers Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and Mohagher Iqbal, and their companions from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This move took many by surprise. There were those who reacted with intense skepticism followed by criticism: The MILF, after all, was a group that had long been locked in combat with our troops. The most vocal of these naysayers expressed tremendous criticism, assailing my integrity, alleging that I had ulterior motives, and casting doubt on my administration’s commitment to transparency. Some asked: Were we not granting the MILF undue leverage in the negotiations? Of what significance was a face-to-face meeting in ending an insurgency that had raged and festered for two generations?