7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have developed a game theory framework that can be used for the design of ISP strategies aiming at
providing efficient and reliable support for P2P streaming application. Our framework allows us to illustrate the existence
of equilibrium points, the role of possible strategies to refine these points, and how to use ideas from the evolutionary game
theory to derive techniques, that a player of the game can use, to computed the (operational) points assuming only limited
knowledge on the state of the other players.
The future developments of this research follow several directions. First of all, we are going to deepen the simulation
based analysis show the relation among peer dynamics, the effects of these dynamics of the fluctuation of the functions Θi-s
and Φi-s, and possible strategies to smoothen these variations.
Another direction we are developing concerns the use of more sophisticated payoff functions that include information
on the size of the ISP and on the subscription fees it applies to its subscribers. This could be obtained by using in Eq. (3) a
term g that depends on the size of the ISP, and on the subscription fees. In other words we could use a term gi
, i.e., function
of the peculiarities of the ISP-i. This model enhancement could explore other different interactions/competitions among the
ISPs, e.g., competition for attracting users, and competition on subscription fees. Furthermore, we can also implement other
fairness criteria, based for instance, on the function gi
, i.e., that accounts for ISP rewards.
7. Conclusions and future workIn this paper we have developed a game theory framework that can be used for the design of ISP strategies aiming atproviding efficient and reliable support for P2P streaming application. Our framework allows us to illustrate the existenceof equilibrium points, the role of possible strategies to refine these points, and how to use ideas from the evolutionary gametheory to derive techniques, that a player of the game can use, to computed the (operational) points assuming only limitedknowledge on the state of the other players.The future developments of this research follow several directions. First of all, we are going to deepen the simulationbased analysis show the relation among peer dynamics, the effects of these dynamics of the fluctuation of the functions Θi-sand Φi-s, and possible strategies to smoothen these variations.Another direction we are developing concerns the use of more sophisticated payoff functions that include informationon the size of the ISP and on the subscription fees it applies to its subscribers. This could be obtained by using in Eq. (3) aterm g that depends on the size of the ISP, and on the subscription fees. In other words we could use a term gi, i.e., functionof the peculiarities of the ISP-i. This model enhancement could explore other different interactions/competitions among theISPs, e.g., competition for attracting users, and competition on subscription fees. Furthermore, we can also implement otherเงื่อนไขยุติธรรม เช่น ตามจิฟังก์ชันเช่น ที่บัญชีสำหรับรางวัล ISP
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