Later that afternoon, Kelly met with higher-level North Korean representatives. Kang reports that Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju, “in a flustered and uncharacteristically unscripted fashion,” declared that the DPRK had the right to pursue nuclear capabilities because Bush had named it as part of an “Axis of Evil,” adding that Pyongyang had even “stronger weapons” for use in retaliation against a U.S. attack.Furthermore, the U.S. preemption doctrine justified North Korea’s reinforcing its Military First Policy and modernizing its military to the maximum extent possible. After listing U.S. failures to fulfill the Agreed Framework, including the promise not to threaten or stage a nuclear attack on the DPRK, Kang offered a pledge, Pritchard reports, to discuss the HEU program in return for a U.S. promise “to recognize North Korea’s system of government; conclude a peace agreement with a nonaggression commitment; and not interfere with North Korea’s economic development.” Pritchard acknowledges that he made “no precise, irrefutable statement—a smoking gun”—admitting the DPRK had an HEU program, explaining how the delegation reached this conclusion after piecing together the North Korean’s words. Most convincing was Kang’s statement that Pyongyang required more developed weapons to occupy an equal footing with the United States in negotiations. 54 Translations of the transcripts of these meetings have differed, raising doubts about U.S. claims. Lacking firm confirmation as well was a report that Ri Gun, North Korea’s chief negotiator, later told Kelly privately that the DPRK already had nuclear weapons and was prepared to test or sell them if the United States continued its threatening, confrontational policy. Tim Beal, senior lecturer at Victoria University, concludes that these rumors have combined with American negotiators interpreting what they heard as what they wanted to hear to transform North Korea’s alleged HEU admission into “a sort of urban myth.”55