It has been argued that the greater the "negotiating slack" (ie discretion granted to negotiators),the less likely it is that trade agreements will be ratified and thus successfully concluded. Alternatively,the dialogue between national ministries or departments with differing preferences will shape outcomes. A case in point would be the contrast between the US State Department interested in strategic goals such as reconstruction in Europe and containing Soviet influence in Europe,and the US Department of commerce interested in export markets for national industries.
We also saw that ideology or shifts in the prevailing paradigm shaping national policies may have an impact. A comparison between 1947-51 and the Uruguay Round provides a comparison between a period when the Cold War was beginning to one when capitalism had been accepted by virtually all countries. Did the absence of ideological conflict between communism and capitalism facilitate the conclusion of the Uruguay Round or make it harder? Have other ideological divides,such as between free trade and sustainable development,reflected in the post Uruguay Round debate rather than the negotiations of the Uruguay Round itself,only become apparent because of the absence of the old ideological divide that influenced most of the 20th century?
Finally,what role did individuals play during the two periods? Personalities such as Cordell Hull, the committed free trader in the US State Department may have shaped the outcome in the late 1940s. Perhaps individual negotiators had an impact by judgements at key times in negotiations. Instinctively one would expect individuals to have less of a role in the 1980-90s because as Chapter 3 has shown there were far more actors around than in the rather select groups that negotiated the GATT and the ITO.
Linkage has also been identified as a potential factor in outcomes. In trade policy this means,in practice,linking progress in one area with that in other policy areas or sectors. There are multilateral 'rounds' of negotiation,rather than continuous negotiations, in part because negotiators have found it helpful to negotiate packages. This permits all negotiators to come out of negotiations with successes and,in terms of negotiating process,enables negotiators to overcome zero-sum or value claiming negotiations and opt for outcomes that benefit all There may,of course,be other linkages between trade policy and other policy areas,perhaps non-economic issues. In the case of the early debates on the post-war trade regime,for example,the US could have linked its aims in trade with aid for Britain during the whole of the 1940s.
If decision-makers in government are preoccupied with political cries or other pressing issues,this may also affect outcomes. For example,it has been argued that the US Congress was preoccupied with Marshall Aid and NATO when the ITO legislation was due for ratification. Likewise, the end of the Cold War in Europe in the late 1980s and its impact on European politics has been seen as a distraction for the European government at a critical stage in the Uruguay Round negotiations.