The generally favourable response to the American war against the Taliban and Al Qeada in Afghanistan was dissipated with the launch of the war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. Russia and China had made no secret of their unhappiness in the UN Security Council at what they regarded as the American rush to war and they drew quiet satisfaction from the divisions that occurred between the United States and some of its main NATO allies in Europe. Japan and South Korea, however, offered symbolic military support. But American prestige suffered as it got bogged down in its two long and costly wars and as its military became overstretched. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century it became clear that the main regional beneficiary was China. Most states in the region were keen to hedge against the uncertainties posed by China’s rise and were less confident in the reliability of the United States as the guarantor of security and stability against the potentially disturbing consequences of China’s growing weight and its more powerful and opaque military power force. Apart from the question of the extent of the degradation of American military power in the wake of its still ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, concern war arising as to how American and the Obama administration in particular would seek to balance its need to cultivate a partnership with China to deal with the high priorities of both regional and global issue and simultaneously to prepare for the risk that China’s rise might turn sour for American’s allies and friends in the region.