7. ConclusionOur approach in this r

7. Conclusion
Our approach in this review is to define earnings quality broadly to be decision use fulness—in any decision by any
decision maker Thus the number of relevant articles is over 300,and by necess it your discussion is broad.
We emphasizetwosignificantconclusionsbasedonoursurveyoftheearningsqualityliteratureasawhole.First,
because alloftheproxiesforearningsqualitythatinvolveearnings(i.e.,propertiessuchaspersistence,timelyloss
recognition, smoothness,andsmallprofits,aswellastheERCs)haveattheircorethereportedaccrual-basedearnings
number, theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm’sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance.
Future researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen
making predictionsandevaluatingresults.Thiswouldhelpusasaprofessiontodeterminethecontributionofthe
accounting measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings.
Second, althoughalloftheproxiesbasedonreportedearningsareaffectedbybothfundamentalperformanceandits
measurement, theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors.Therefore,theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame
underlying construct.Inaddition,becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness,weshouldnot
expect theproxiestoworkequallywellinallcircumstancesinvestigatedbyresearchers.Wehopethebreadthofthe
discussion ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext-specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe
sometimes subtledistinctionsbetweenthem.
As partofourreviewprocess,wenotedfiveareasofresearchthathavereceivedrelativelylittleattention;webelieve
that furtherresearchonthesetopicswouldsubstantiallyenhanceourunderstandingofearningsquality.
(1)Whenmakingchoicesthataffectreportedearnings,amanager’sobjectivefunctioncanincludemultiple,andperhaps
competing,objectives.Theseobjectivescouldrelatetocompensationordebtcontractprovisions,litigationrisk,proprietary
costs,orincentivestoinfluencestockprice,tonameafew.Therearetwonoteworthyfeaturesofthemanager’sdecision
problem.First,managersareconstrainedtoreportonlyoneearningsnumber,buttheexistenceofmultipleobjectivesmay
require trade-offs.Second,managerschoosea set (or portfolio)ofaccountingchoices,notjustone,thatdeterminesearnings,
whichsuggeststhattheymighthavetheflexibilitytotailorindividualelementsofthesettodifferentobjectives.89 Two
interestingpathsforfutureresearchare(i)toexaminehowmanagerschoosebetweencompetingobjectivesand(ii)to
examinechoicesabouttheportfolioofaccountingchoices,specificallywithinthecontextofmeetingmultipleobjectives.
The existingliteratureincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminecompetingmultipleincentives(mostcommonly
financial reporting,taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions),butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea single
accounting choice (e.g., loanlossprovisions).Theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple
accounting choicestoachievea single objective (e.g., usingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals),but
studies ofthistypearerelativelylimited.Theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset
of accountingchoicestomeetmultipleobjectives,despitevariationintheabilityofspecificaccountingchoicestomeet
specific objectives.90 All typesofaccrualchoices,forexample,mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation,butthey
might differintheirtransparencytoequitymarkets,andhenceintheirimpactonequityvaluationdecisions.
Theorypapershaveexaminedtheimpactofmultipleincentivesonaccountingchoice(e.g., Demski,1973;Evansand
Sridhar,1996;Liang,2004;Chenetal.,2007) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts(SridharandMagee,
1996). Thesemodels,however,aregenerallyconcernedwiththeimplicationsofmultipleobjectivesonasingleaccounting
choice;theydonotaddresstheissueofthefirmmakingaportfolioofaccountingchoicesthatintheaggregateaffect
earnings. Christensenetal.(2005) specificallyrecognizethepotentialforaninteractionbetweencompetingincentivesand
individualaccountingchoices: ‘‘Increasingthepersistentcomponentsandreducingthereversiblecomponentsaregenerally
desirableforvaluation,butnotforcontracting.Eliminatingtransitorycomponentsofearningsisgenerallydesirableforvaluation,
butnotnecessarilyforcontracting.’’(p.265) KirschenheiterandMelumad(2002) makearelatedpoint.Assuminganobjective
of equityvaluemaximization,theyshowthatthenatureofthemanager’sprivateinformationaboutcashflows(‘‘good’’news
or ‘‘bad’’news)determineswhethertheoutcomeofheraccountingchoiceswillbesmootherearningsorbigbaths.Thisresult
hasimplicationsforunconditionallyinterpretingsmoothnessasaproxyforearningsmanagement.
Researchers alsocanthinkabout‘‘multiple’’incentivesaschangesinincentivesthroughtime.Domanagerstradeoffthe
immediate benefitsofopportunisticaccountingchoicesatthetimeofaneventsuchasanIPOorSEOagainstthepotential
long-term reputationlossduetotheseone-offearningsmanagementdecisions?

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 1:

7. บทสรุปวิธีการของเราในบทความนี้คือการ กำหนดคุณภาพกำไรทั่วไปจะ ตัดสินใจใช้ fulness — ในการตัดสินใจใด ๆ โดยมีตัดสินใจดังนี้หมายเลขของบทความที่เกี่ยวข้องเป็นกว่า 300 และ โดยเกรด สนทนาของคุณเป็นวงกว้างเรา emphasizetwosignificantconclusionsbasedonoursurveyoftheearningsqualityliteratureasawhole ครั้งแรกเนื่องจาก alloftheproxiesforearningsqualitythatinvolveearnings (i.e.,propertiessuchaspersistence,timelylossการรับรู้ ราบรื่น andsmallprofits, aswellastheERCs) haveattheircorethereportedaccrual-basedearningsหมายเลข theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm'sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformanceResearchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen ในอนาคตทำ predictionsandevaluatingresults Thiswouldhelpusasaprofessiontodeterminethecontributionoftheบัญชี measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings2, althoughalloftheproxiesbasedonreportedearningsareaffectedbybothfundamentalperformanceanditsวัด theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors ดังนั้น theproxiesdonotmeasurethesameสร้างต้นแบบ Inaddition, becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness, weshouldnotคาดว่า theproxiestoworkequallywellinallcircumstancesinvestigatedbyresearchers Wehopethebreadthoftheสนทนา ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext-specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthesometimes subtledistinctionsbetweenthem.As partofourreviewprocess,wenotedfiveareasofresearchthathavereceivedrelativelylittleattention;webelievethat furtherresearchonthesetopicswouldsubstantiallyenhanceourunderstandingofearningsquality.(1)Whenmakingchoicesthataffectreportedearnings,amanager’sobjectivefunctioncanincludemultiple,andperhapscompeting,objectives.Theseobjectivescouldrelatetocompensationordebtcontractprovisions,litigationrisk,proprietarycosts,orincentivestoinfluencestockprice,tonameafew.Therearetwonoteworthyfeaturesofthemanager’sdecisionproblem.First,managersareconstrainedtoreportonlyoneearningsnumber,buttheexistenceofmultipleobjectivesmayrequire trade-offs.Second,managerschoosea set (or portfolio)ofaccountingchoices,notjustone,thatdeterminesearnings,whichsuggeststhattheymighthavetheflexibilitytotailorindividualelementsofthesettodifferentobjectives.89 Twointerestingpathsforfutureresearchare(i)toexaminehowmanagerschoosebetweencompetingobjectivesand(ii)toexaminechoicesabouttheportfolioofaccountingchoices,specificallywithinthecontextofmeetingmultipleobjectives.The existingliteratureincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminecompetingmultipleincentives(mostcommonlyfinancial reporting,taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions),butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea singleaccounting choice (e.g., loanlossprovisions).Theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultipleaccounting choicestoachievea single objective (e.g., usingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals),butstudies ofthistypearerelativelylimited.Theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoverasetof accountingchoicestomeetmultipleobjectives,despitevariationintheabilityofspecificaccountingchoicestomeetspecific objectives.90 All typesofaccrualchoices,forexample,mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation,buttheymight differintheirtransparencytoequitymarkets,andhenceintheirimpactonequityvaluationdecisions.Theorypapershaveexaminedtheimpactofmultipleincentivesonaccountingchoice(e.g., Demski,1973;EvansandSridhar,1996;Liang,2004;Chenetal.,2007) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts(SridharandMagee,1996). Thesemodels,however,aregenerallyconcernedwiththeimplicationsofmultipleobjectivesonasingleaccountingchoice;theydonotaddresstheissueofthefirmmakingaportfolioofaccountingchoicesthatintheaggregateaffectearnings. Christensenetal.(2005) specificallyrecognizethepotentialforaninteractionbetweencompetingincentivesandindividualaccountingchoices: ‘‘Increasingthepersistentcomponentsandreducingthereversiblecomponentsaregenerallydesirableforvaluation,butnotforcontracting.Eliminatingtransitorycomponentsofearningsisgenerallydesirableforvaluation,butnotnecessarilyforcontracting.’’(p.265) KirschenheiterandMelumad(2002) makearelatedpoint.Assuminganobjectiveof equityvaluemaximization,theyshowthatthenatureofthemanager’sprivateinformationaboutcashflows(‘‘good’’newsหรือข่าว ''เลว '') determineswhethertheoutcomeofheraccountingchoiceswillbesmootherearningsorbigbaths Thisresulthasimplicationsforunconditionallyinterpretingsmoothnessasaproxyforearningsmanagementนักวิจัย alsocanthinkabout นิ้วหลายนิ้ว incentivesaschangesinincentivesthroughtime DomanagerstradeoffthebenefitsofopportunisticaccountingchoicesatthetimeofaneventsuchasanIPOorSEOagainstthepotential ทันทีreputationlossduetotheseone ระยะยาว-offearningsmanagementdecisions

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 2:

7.
สรุปวิธีการของเราในการทบทวนนี้คือการกำหนดคุณภาพกำไรในวงกว้างที่จะมีการตัดสินใจใช้ความสมบูรณ์ในการตัดสินใจใดๆ
โดยการตัดสินใจดังนั้นจำนวนบทความที่เกี่ยวข้องที่มีมากกว่า300 และมัน necess การสนทนาของคุณเป็นวงกว้าง.
เรา เรียบเนียน andsmallprofits, aswellastheERCs) haveattheircorethereportedaccrual-basedearnings จำนวน theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm'sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance. ในอนาคต researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen ทำ measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings. ประการที่สอง theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors.Therefore, theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame พื้นฐาน construct.Inaddition, becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness, weshouldnot คาดหวัง ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext-specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe บางครั้ง subtledistinctionsbetweenthem. ในฐานะที่เป็น การค้า offs.Second ชุด managerschoosea (หรือ รายงาน taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions) butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea เดียวกับทางเลือกการบัญชี(เช่น loanlossprovisions) .Theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple choicestoachievea บัญชีวัตถุประสงค์เดียว (เช่น usingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals) แต่การศึกษาofthistypearerelativelylimited.Theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset ของ objectives.90 typesofaccrualchoices ทั้งหมดตามตัวอย่าง mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation, butthey อาจ Demski 1973; Evansand Sridhar 1996; เหลียง, 2004. Chenetal 2007) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts (SridharandMagee, 1996) Christensenetal. (2005) KirschenheiterandMelumad (2002) makearelatedpoint.Assuminganobjective ของ reputationlossduetotheseone-offearningsmanagementdecisions?

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 3:

7 . สรุป
วิธีการของเราในการทบทวนนี้เป็นการกำหนดคุณภาพกำไรกว้างเพื่อใช้ในการตัดสินใจใด ๆเมื่อตัดสินใจอะไร
ผู้ตัดสินใจดังนั้นจำนวนของบทความที่เกี่ยวข้องมากกว่า 300 และโดย necess มันการสนทนาของคุณกว้าง emphasizetwosignificantconclusionsbasedonoursurveyoftheearningsqualityliteratureasawhole

เรา ครั้งแรกเพราะ alloftheproxiesforearningsqualitythatinvolveearnings ( เช่น propertiessuchaspersistence timelyloss
, การรับรู้ , เรียบ , andsmallprofits aswellastheercs , ) haveattheircorethereportedaccrual basedearnings
หมายเลข theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm'sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance .
อนาคต researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen
ทำให้ predictionsandevaluatingresults . measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings บัญชี thiswouldhelpusasaprofessiontodeterminethecontributionofthe
.
2 วัด althoughalloftheproxiesbasedonreportedearningsareaffectedbybothfundamentalperformanceandits
,theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors ดังนั้น theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame
) สร้าง และ becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness weshouldnot
คาดหวัง , theproxiestoworkequallywellinallcircumstancesinvestigatedbyresearchers wehopethebreadthofthe อภิปราย ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe

.บางครั้ง subtledistinctionsbetweenthem .
เป็น partofourreviewprocess wenotedfiveareasofresearchthathavereceivedrelativelylittleattention ; ที่ furtherresearchonthesetopicswouldsubstantiallyenhanceourunderstandingofearningsquality , webelieve
.
( 1 ) whenmakingchoicesthataffectreportedearnings amanager'sobjectivefunctioncanincludemultiple andperhaps
, , แข่งขัน , วัตถุประสงค์theseobjectivescouldrelatetocompensationordebtcontractprovisions litigationrisk กรรมสิทธิ์
, ค่าใช้จ่าย , orincentivestoinfluencestockprice tonameafew , ปัญหา therearetwonoteworthyfeaturesofthemanager'sdecision

managersareconstrainedtoreportonlyoneearningsnumber แรก buttheexistenceofmultipleobjectivesmay
ต้อง trade-offs วินาที managerschoosea ชุด ( หรือเอกสาร ) ofaccountingchoices notjustone , ,thatdeterminesearnings
2
, whichsuggeststhattheymighthavetheflexibilitytotailorindividualelementsofthesettodifferentobjectives.89 interestingpathsforfutureresearchare ( ฉัน ) toexaminehowmanagerschoosebetweencompetingobjectivesand ( 2 ) examinechoicesabouttheportfolioofaccountingchoices

,
specificallywithinthecontextofmeetingmultipleobjectives .การ existingliteratureincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminecompetingmultipleincentives ( mostcommonly
การรายงานทางการเงิน taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions ) butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea เดียว
บัญชีทางเลือก ( เช่น loanlossprovisions ) theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple
choicestoachievea มีบัญชีเดียว ( เช่นusingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals ) แต่

ของการศึกษา ofthistypearerelativelylimited . theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset accountingchoicestomeetmultipleobjectives despitevariationintheabilityofspecificaccountingchoicestomeet
, เฉพาะ objectives.90 ทั้งหมด typesofaccrualchoices คือ mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation มาก
, ,อาจ differintheirtransparencytoequitymarkets andhenceintheirimpactonequityvaluationdecisions , .
theorypapershaveexaminedtheimpactofmultipleincentivesonaccountingchoice ( เช่น demski 1973 ; evansand
ศรี , 1996 ; เลี่ยง , 2004 ; chenetal . , 2007 ) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts ( sridharandmagee
, 1996 ) thesemodels อย่างไรก็ตามaregenerallyconcernedwiththeimplicationsofmultipleobjectivesonasingleaccounting
เลือก กำไร theydonotaddresstheissueofthefirmmakingaportfolioofaccountingchoicesthatintheaggregateaffect

christensenetal . ( 2548 ) specificallyrecognizethepotentialforaninteractionbetweencompetingincentivesand
individualaccountingchoices :' 'increasingthepersistentcomponentsandreducingthereversiblecomponentsaregenerally desirableforvaluation butnotforcontracting eliminatingtransitorycomponentsofearningsisgenerallydesirableforvaluation
, .
butnotnecessarilyforcontracting , ' ' ( p.265 ) kirschenheiterandmelumad ( 2002 ) makearelatedpoint . assuminganobjective ของ equityvaluemaximization
,theyshowthatthenatureofthemanager'sprivateinformationaboutcashflows ( ''good ''news
หรือ ' 'bad ''news ) determineswhethertheoutcomeofheraccountingchoiceswillbesmootherearningsorbigbaths . thisresult hasimplicationsforunconditionallyinterpretingsmoothnessasaproxyforearningsmanagement
.
นักวิจัย alsocanthinkabout ''multiple ''incentivesaschangesinincentivesthroughtime domanagerstradeoffthe
.ทันที benefitsofopportunisticaccountingchoicesatthetimeofaneventsuchasanipoorseoagainstthepotential
ระยะยาว reputationlossduetotheseone offearningsmanagementdecisions ?