Some readers may object to this paper's interpretation of 9(4) because it
could result in an overly broad obligation. On the one hand, this understanding
of a transnational prevention obligation might be seen as too vague to be
enforceable (discussed above). On the other hand, readers may be concerned
with possible unintended overly broad and intrusive obligations this
interpretation may place on States Parties. This interpretation, it could be argued,
would open origin countries up to interference with cultural practices or beliefs
that they have fiercely protected in the international human rights arena. Seen as
a slippery slope, this argument maintains that a shared prevention responsibility
cannot possibly be what the drafters of the Protocol envisioned.
For example, Coomaraswamy reported that "[i]n the absence of equal
opportunities for education, shelter, food, employment, relief from unpaid
domestic and reproductive labour, access to structures of formal State power,
and freedom from violence, women will continue to be trafficked." 132
Transnational prevention programs that could address these root causes may
seek to amend marriage laws in origin countries that do not allow for equal
rights of men and women in the marriage. They could create programs that
attack cultural practices such as female genital mutilation or polygamy. These are
highly contentious issues and areas where states and the local populations have
resisted outside advocacy for change. For example, the article on marriage
equality in the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) is the one with the most reservations from States Parties, many of
whom are also origin, destination and transit countries.'33 A shared prevention responsibility, it is argued, cannot therefore possibly be what was envisioned
when drafting the Protocol.
In response, it is important to reiterate that this paper merely seeks to set
out a starting point, a base obligation. The contours of state consent are still
unclear, and it is uncertain how willing origin countries will be to transnational
programs that address sensitive cultural issues. Although developing countries
have welcomed economic and technical cooperation internationally, it is unclear
how they would react to programs aimed at controversial cultural practices.
Uruguay made a statement in its concluding remarks, where it was
speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 (and Pakistan).134 A representative of
Uruguay stated that they "wished to reiterate the importance of reinforcing
technical and economic cooperation internationally, as a means of giving States
the possibility to fulfill all the obligations arising from the Convention."135
The Group of 77 was not concerned that the international cooperation set
out in the Protocol would impede on their sovereignty, although they only
conceived of cooperation as being purely economic and technical. It may well be
that as a result of realpolik, the prevention programs set up pursuant to this
provision will focus on less contentious issues, such as access to education,
shelter, food and employment.