5. Empirical results
5.1. Manipulation checks and negotiation descriptive statistics
We ran two manipulation checks to ensure that the experimental setting worked as intended. The first relates to the
collectivism measure. This measure must be compared across experimental groups, all of which relate to negotiation
teams (not individuals). The team-level collectivism score is the average collectivism score across team members.
Although it is reasonable to assume, for example, that a purely German team will score lower on collectivism than a
German team with a French cultural moderator, the result is not so obvious, because collectivism (a deep level of culture,
used in our hypotheses) and nationality (a surface level of culture, used for manipulation of collectivism) are not
necessarily equivalent. However, French teams scored significantly higher on the collectivism measure than the German
selling teams (4.54 vs. 3.97; p < .01; h = .49). Consequently, we can test Hypotheses 1 and 2. When a French (German)
team was equipped with a German (French) cultural moderator, the level of collectivism decreased from 4.54 to 4.14
(p < .05) (increased from 3.97 to 4.26; p = .13), in the intended directions. Although the second effect is statistically
insignificant, the effect size is medium for both cases (h = .36 and .31, respectively). Thus, our rationale behind
Hypotheses 3 and 4 is empirically justified (a detailed justification for using effect sizes follows in Section 5.2). The
collectivism scores are unspecific to individuals’ roles (cultural moderators, ‘‘regular’’ team members, buyers), as we
show in Appendix D.
The second manipulation check relates to the items that describe the ‘‘perception of the intercultural setting’’ (see Section
4.3.4 and Appendix B.3). Both item scores were significantly lower than the scale mean of 4 (3.57 for ‘‘aware’’ and 3.46 for
‘‘obvious,’’ respectively; p < .01 in both cases); that is, the participants realized that the simulation took place in an
intercultural setting.
Beyond the manipulation, we looked at how well the participants understood the duality and complementarity
of pursuing individual and joint outcomes. In line with the incentive to ‘‘strive for a good own monetary
outcome without harming the other party,’’ both distributive and integrative strategies were used almost equally
often.