wild,1995). A higher value indicates a greater level of manipulation in the financial statements and thus a lower earnings quality. Also following Ahmed et al. (2010) we will estimate model (6) using the signed value of discretionary accruals so as to control for the consistency of the results. In order to test hypotheses H4a and we introduced the absolute and signed value of performance – matched discretionary accruals (DACC) respectively as the dependent variable in the following model:
DACCit|DACC|it=c0+c1IFRSit+c2AUDit+c3DVOLit+c4AUD*DVOLit
+c5AUD*IFRSit+βControlit+γ year dummies (6)
+δindustry dummies+uit
Where:
IFRS is a dummy receiving (1) for the post –IFRS period (2005-2008) and (0) otherwise
AUD is a dummy receiving (1) if the firm is audited by PwC,KPMG,Grand Thornton,
E&Y or D&T and(0) otherwise
DVOL is a dummy receiving(1) for voluntary IFRS adopters and(0) otherwise
AUD*IFRS is the interaction term between AUD and IFRS
If H4a is true we expect a negative coefficient on the IFRS and DVOL variables indicating that the adoption of IFRS for both voluntary and mandatory adopters has resulted in less earning management behavior. Additionally, if H4b is valid we expect to find a negative and statistically significant co efficient on the interaction terms AUD*IFRS and DVOL*AUD suggesting that big -5 audit firms provide better quality audits than local audit firms, meaning that they have greater abilities and incentives in the enforcement of more