III. METHOD
Experimental Design and Overview
In our experiment, participants in all treatment conditions are provided with selected data from
two firms’ financial statements, including some common metrics used in loan agreements. Data
relating to the first firm are identical across experimental conditions. For the second firm, we
manipulate whether optional renewal periods of a lease are capitalized and, if so, whether the
amount is combined in a single line with the fixed portion of the lease term or is presented on a
separate line, resulting in a 1 3 3 experimental design (renewal options not capitalized; renewal
options capitalized and aggregated; renewal options capitalized and disaggregated). Participants in
all treatment conditions indicate which one of the two firms they will lend to, based on the
information provided to them. Because we hold the underlying economics of the two firms constant
across conditions, any differences in participants’ lending decisions across treatment conditions
must be attributed to the variation in the accounting for and reporting of lease renewal options
across conditions.
Participants
Forty-two master’s students from a large state university were recruited by in-class
announcements for participation in this experiment. Thirty-six of these participants were M.B.A.
students who had completed their core financial accounting courses. The remaining six were
students in a Master of Quantitative and Computational Finance program and had completed
coursework that dealt with leases. On average, participants were 28.4 years of age (S.D. ¼ 3.25
years) and had 5.25 years of full-time work experience (S.D. ¼ 3.14 years). Neither age nor work
experience differs significantly by condition. Participants took, on average, approximately 20
minutes to complete the materials, which were administered to them in an experimental laboratory.
Participants did not receive any compensation for their participation.
Because professionals lenders represent a costly subject pool (Libby et al. 2002), we chose to
use master’s students to test our hypotheses. M.B.A. students have often been used in the past to
proxy for nonprofessional investors and, while this design choice has been subject to criticism,
Elliott et al. (2007) provide evidence that using M.B.A. students to proxy for nonprofessional
investors is a valid methodological choice, provided researchers match a task’s integrative
complexity with the appropriate level of M.B.A. student. In a similar vein, we argue that our
M.B.A. students, with their significant full-time work experience and completed coursework, are a
reasonable proxy for many of the lenders who will be affected by the proposed leasing standard
(e.g., nonprofessional investors in the bond market, lenders at local community banks, and other
small business commercial lenders). We return to this issue of our experimental design again in the
conclusion when we discuss some of the limitations of our study
III. METHOD
Experimental Design and Overview
In our experiment, participants in all treatment conditions are provided with selected data from
two firms’ financial statements, including some common metrics used in loan agreements. Data
relating to the first firm are identical across experimental conditions. For the second firm, we
manipulate whether optional renewal periods of a lease are capitalized and, if so, whether the
amount is combined in a single line with the fixed portion of the lease term or is presented on a
separate line, resulting in a 1 3 3 experimental design (renewal options not capitalized; renewal
options capitalized and aggregated; renewal options capitalized and disaggregated). Participants in
all treatment conditions indicate which one of the two firms they will lend to, based on the
information provided to them. Because we hold the underlying economics of the two firms constant
across conditions, any differences in participants’ lending decisions across treatment conditions
must be attributed to the variation in the accounting for and reporting of lease renewal options
across conditions.
Participants
Forty-two master’s students from a large state university were recruited by in-class
announcements for participation in this experiment. Thirty-six of these participants were M.B.A.
students who had completed their core financial accounting courses. The remaining six were
students in a Master of Quantitative and Computational Finance program and had completed
coursework that dealt with leases. On average, participants were 28.4 years of age (S.D. ¼ 3.25
years) and had 5.25 years of full-time work experience (S.D. ¼ 3.14 years). Neither age nor work
experience differs significantly by condition. Participants took, on average, approximately 20
minutes to complete the materials, which were administered to them in an experimental laboratory.
Participants did not receive any compensation for their participation.
Because professionals lenders represent a costly subject pool (Libby et al. 2002), we chose to
use master’s students to test our hypotheses. M.B.A. students have often been used in the past to
proxy for nonprofessional investors and, while this design choice has been subject to criticism,
Elliott et al. (2007) provide evidence that using M.B.A. students to proxy for nonprofessional
investors is a valid methodological choice, provided researchers match a task’s integrative
complexity with the appropriate level of M.B.A. student. In a similar vein, we argue that our
M.B.A. students, with their significant full-time work experience and completed coursework, are a
reasonable proxy for many of the lenders who will be affected by the proposed leasing standard
(e.g., nonprofessional investors in the bond market, lenders at local community banks, and other
small business commercial lenders). We return to this issue of our experimental design again in the
conclusion when we discuss some of the limitations of our study
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