Conclusion and Discussion As independent agencies are insulated from politics and the electoral process, scholars have emphasized the importance of the inclusion of accountability arrangements in the design of these organizations. However, the degree to which such arrangements are, in practice, incorporated into the statutes of the organizations varies considerably. This study has addressed the question why some independent agencies are subject to more provisions for accountability than others. From previous research, we know about the impact of such factors as the need for credible commitments, policy complexity, and government capacity. A factor which has not yet been included in studies on the institutional design of agencies is political salience. Although previous studies have pointed at the importance of political salience for such outcomes as voting behavior, political choices of government and parliament, and de facto control over bureaucracies and independent agencies, we do not know much about its effect on the institutional design of organizations. This study therefore examines the impact of political salience on statutory provisions for political accountability, controlling for other determinants of delegation to independent agencies. To do so, original data have been used on the accountability provisions in the statutes of 103 Dutch independent agencies. The results of the analysis show that political salience is an important determinant of the degree of formal political accountability. Salience affects accountability in two ways. First of all, independent agencies which operate in more salient issue areas are also subject to more extensive accountability arrangements. This is, to begin with, relevant from a theoretical point of view. Previous research has shown that political salience has an impact on the de facto control which politicians choose to exercise over the activities of agencies. This study demonstrates that salience also affects the institutional design of independent agencies. Hence we know now that independent agencies which deal with salient policy issues are not only subject to more political steering and influencing, but they are also made subject to more statutory provisions for accountability.