The most complex case is when the debtors are a large number of private sector firms, as
was the case in Indonesia. The sheer number of debtors and creditors involved, the paucity of
accurate information on many firms (especially if they are not publicly listed), and the weakness of
judicial systems in many emerging markets all complicate such proceedings. At this point, there
are few international precedents to work from. But as complicated as was the Indonesia case,
many creditors believe that such a workout deal could have been arranged in the early stages of
the crisis, and as late as January 1998, had the idea been supported and pushed by the IMF, the
US Treasury, and the Japanese government (since Japanese banks were Indonesia=s major
creditors).9
Instead, Indonesia=s first IMF program did not even mention the private sector debt,
and the second program gave it very low priority, even though this debt was clearly at the heart of
the crisis. Only by the third program, when it was far too late, did the private sector debt become
a higher priority. Although such arrangements would be complicated, surely the international
community can do better than throw up its hands and watch a creditor grab race undermine the
residual value of debtor firms.
9
See Asian Wall Street Journal, AWhy Indonesia Never Got a Debt Deal,@ November 4,
1998.