MGRM’s strategy has received support in a recent paper by Christopher Culp and Merton Miller, “Metallgesellschaft and the Economics of Synthetic Storage,” which appeared in the previous issue of this journal (Winter 1995). Since our analysis of Metallgesellschaft’s debacle differs significantly from theirs, we sketch here the main points of agreement and differences between the two papers. The areas of agreement are much greater than might be supposed, given the large degree of public controversy surrounding the case. First, there is agreement that using a rolling stack to hedge a flow of deliveries may produce temporarily large negative cash flows. The warnings of the Group of Thirty regarding potential funding risks and the need for thorough stress tests of any derivative strategy should be kept in mind when considering the rolling stack. There is also agreement that the cash flow losses in the case of Metallgesellschaft were quite large. Culp and Miller estimate $650 million from price declines and another $250 million due to rollover costs, for a total cash flow loss on the futures leg of the transaction of $900 million. In our Table 1 we estimated $1.17 billion. The special auditors calculated losses on the futures and OTC swaps portfolios at $413 million by the end of September 1993 and at over $1.276 billion by the end of December. MGRM’s original management had estimated losses on the rolling stack of $434 million through September, prior to the spectacular price drop in November and December. The differences among all of these estimates is small relative to the range in which all of the estimates lie and given the assumptions buried in each of the calculations. $900 million is a large cash flow deficit to finance in a single calendar year.