9. Some Issues that Cut Across Several Themes
9.1 Natural Resources and Global Justice
Discussion of natural resources often figure prominently in several topics of global justice. Some relevant questions include: Are national communities entitled to the resources they find on their territories? Should principles of global justice apply to our arrangements for justly distributing natural resources? Charles Beitz was an early proponent of a resource distribution principle, according to which natural resources should be allocated such that each society is able to provide adequately for its population (Beitz 1975). We saw in Section 2 that Rawls believes that resources are not important to prosperity in the ways many imagine. Rather, institutional resilience matters more. By contrast, Thomas Pogge highlights the ways in which international practices concerning the distribution of resources create considerable obstacles for prosperity in developing countries. In short, these practices create incentives for the wrong kinds of people to take power through illegitimate means and to focus on retaining power at the expense of other goals governments should have, such as trying to improve the well-being of their citizens. We need to modify these international practices so they do not create such an unfavorable environment. In addition, Pogge proposes a Global Resources Dividend as one measure by which practices concerning natural resource distribution would work in some small way to the benefit of the global poor. On this Global Resources Dividend proposal there would be a small tax on resource extraction, payable by the consumers of resources, and available for projects that would assist in helping everyone to be able to meet their basic needs with dignity (Pogge 2008).
Leif Wenar is also concerned with prevailing practices governing the sale of natural resources and their products (Wenar 2010). When consumers in wealthy states buy goods from developing countries, this is often similar to consciously receiving stolen goods. Legitimate resource sales require general agreement from citizens. Evidence of agreement requires that: (i) owners must be informed about sales, (ii) owners must be able to express dissent freely should they have doubts about sales, and (iii) owners should be able to stop resource sales without fearing grave consequences such as violence and intimidation. In these sorts of ways, Wenar aims to outlaw dispossession of citizens’ resources.
For various reasons (including strategic ones) Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar do not directly challenge the right of nations to own resources on their territories. Policy recommendations, for instance, are much more likely to be effective if they can fit within the main structures of international conventions. However, other theorists do take up this issue including Hillel Steiner, Tim Hayward and Mathias Risse. Steiner argues that all inhabitants of the world are entitled to an equal share in the value of all land and he advocates for the “Global Fund” which aims to ensure that equal share entitlements can be secured. The Global Fund would constitute a clearing house for payments and disbursements (Steiner 2005).
Appealing to accounts of ownership of resources, some philosophers draw out important implications for diverse global justice debates. Mathias Risse argues that we all, collectively, own the resources of the earth and this has profound implications for a range of global justice issues, including immigration. When people are under-utilizing their “rightful shares” of territory, they cannot complain when co-owners would like to occupy some of it. Some theorists concerned with environmental issues also discuss our rights with respect to natural resources. Some argue that we have equal rights to access the earth’s resources. Tim Hayward, for instance, argues that we have equal rights to ecological space (Hayward 2005). This is often appealed to when there is a perception that we have exceeded our share, such as in levels of carbon emissions and consumption more generally.
Accounts according to which we have equal rights to resources, land, ecological space and so on, are often accused of suffering from an important common problem. It is difficult to defend a clear and compelling account of the value of resources as these can vary considerably in different social, cultural and technological contexts. But we need to be able to quantify resource values to some plausible extent, if we are to determine whether people are enjoying or exceeding their equal shares.
9.2 Allocating Responsibilities for Global Problems
There are a number of global justice problems that require remedying, and this raises the issue of remedial responsibilities. Who should do what to reduce global injustices? Several different agents, groups, organizations and institutions could play a role. Which responsibilities should devolve to corporations, governments, consumers, citizens, international organizations or social movements? Several guidelines that are often discussed include issues concerning the contribution agents have made to a problem, their patterns of benefit from the problem, and their capacity to take constructive action now. Two influential frameworks deserve more extended treatment, notably that of Iris Marion Young concerning a social connection model for allocating responsibilities for structural injustice and that of David Miller concerning remedial responsibility (Young 2011, Miller 2007).
In contrast to the idea of responsibility as involving finding fault and individual liability, Iris Marion Young develops a forward-looking model which she argues is more appropriate. She draws on the idea that participation via institutions sometimes produces injustice, so we have particular responsibilities to address injustice. We share responsibility for remedying injustice but we may have different degrees and kinds of responsibility. She offers different parameters of reasoning that can help individuals and organizations decide what might make the most sense for them to do in efforts to remedy injustice, given that there are so many injustices, whereas time and resources are limited. Using the case study of the global apparel industry she illustrates how the fact that we are positioned differently can entail varying but important responsibilities for all who participate in activities that sustain sweatshops. There are at least four parameters that agents can use in their reasoning:
Power: we have different levels of influence and capacities to change processes. We should focus on those areas where we have greater capacities to change worrisome structural processes. This might mean focusing on a few key players who have both greater capacity to make changes themselves and to influence others.
Privilege: some people have more privilege than others in relation to structures. So middle-class clothing consumers have more discretionary income, choice and ability to absorb costs—they can change their clothing purchasing practices more easily than those who earn minimum wage, have little discretionary income, and little ability to absorb further costs.
Interest: All who have an interest in changing oppressive structures have responsibilities in connection with remedying these. This entails that “victims” too have important responsibilities since they have a great interest in eliminating oppression. In a nuanced analysis she argues that they might have responsibilities in certain contexts, such as to speak out about the harsh conditions in which they work. They must take some responsibility for resisting and challenging the structures. Without their participation the need for reforms may be rationalized away or reforms may not take the required form. These obligations may not always exist, especially when the costs of resistance would require extraordinary sacrifices.
Collective ability: In some cases we already have collective organization capacities and resources that are well established. Sometimes it just makes good practical sense to draw on these. So, for instance, sometimes student associations, faith-based organizations, unions, or stockholder groups already exercise significant power in being able to coordinate like-minded members who are willing to take certain actions. She encourages us to harness organizational resources where doing so would prove effective.
In summary, Young encourages us to think about how we can best take responsibility for reducing structural injustice by reflecting on these four parameters—different positions of power, privilege, interest and collective ability.
David Miller offers a tremendously influential connection theory of responsibility that also discusses our remedial responsibilities. There are six ways in which we can be connected to someone, P, who needs help and so be held remedially responsible for assisting. These connections give rise to six ways in which remedial responsibility can be identified. We might be morally responsible for P’s condition; we might be outcome or causally responsible for P’s condition; we might have had no causal role in their condition but have benefited from it; we might have capacity to assist P; or we might be connected to P through ties of community.[4]
In the global justice literature there are also important concerns about the distribution of responsibilities among collective and individual agents. Prominently, can we hold nations responsible for global injustices or remedying such injustices? This raises important questions about collective responsibility that are well treated elsewhere in this encyclopedia (see the entry on collective responsibility.
9.3 Authority in the Global Domain: Do We Need a World State to Secure Global Justice?
Is it possible to have global justice in the absence of a world state? Hobbes argues that this is not possible since there is no global authority that can sec
9. บางประเด็นที่ตัดข้ามหลายรูปแบบ9.1 ทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและความยุติธรรมสากลสนทนาของธรรมชาติมักจะคิดในหัวข้อต่าง ๆ ของความยุติธรรมสากลจึง รวมคำถามที่เกี่ยวข้อง: ชุมชนแห่งชาติรับทรัพยากรที่พวกเขาค้นหาในเขตแดนของตนหรือไม่ หลักความยุติธรรมสากลควรใช้กับบริการของเรากระจายทรัพยากรธรรมชาติศรีวิชัย ชาร์ลส์ Beitz เป็น proponent เป็นต้นเป็นทรัพยากรการแจกจ่ายหลักการ ตามที่ทรัพยากรธรรมชาติควรปันส่วนที่แต่ละสังคมจะสามารถให้เพียงพอสำหรับประชากร (Beitz 1975) เราเห็นใน 2 ส่วนที่ Rawls เชื่อว่า ทรัพยากรไม่สำคัญเพื่อความเจริญในแบบที่หลายคนคิด แต่ ความยืดหยุ่นสถาบันเรื่องขึ้น โดยคมชัด Thomas Pogge เน้นวิธีการปฏิบัติสากลที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการกระจายทรัพยากรสร้างอุปสรรคมากสำหรับความเจริญรุ่งเรืองในประเทศกำลังพัฒนา ในระยะสั้น แนวทางปฏิบัติเหล่านี้สร้างแรงจูงใจชนิดไม่ถูกต้องของผู้ใช้ไฟฟ้า โดยวิธีนอกกฎหมาย และเน้นอำนาจรักษาการค่าใช้จ่ายของรัฐบาลอื่น ๆ เป้าหมายควร มี เช่นพยายามที่จะปรับปรุงดีของประชาชน เราจำเป็นต้องปรับเปลี่ยนแนวทางปฏิบัติระหว่างประเทศเหล่านี้เพื่อให้พวกเขาไม่สร้างดังกล่าวมีสภาพแวดล้อม นอกจากนี้ Pogge เสนอผลทรัพยากรโลกเป็นวัดหนึ่งที่ปฏิบัติเกี่ยวกับการกระจายทรัพยากรธรรมชาติจะทำงานในเรื่องเล็กน้อยเพื่อประโยชน์ของคนจนทั่วโลก ในข้อเสนอนี้ปันทรัพยากรส่วนกลาง จะมีภาษีเล็กบนทรัพยากรสกัด เจ้าหนี้ผู้บริโภคทรัพยากร และมีโครงการที่จะช่วยในการช่วยให้ทุกคนเพื่อให้สามารถตอบสนองความต้องการพื้นฐาน ด้วยศักดิ์ศรี (Pogge 2008)บิ Wenar นั้นยัง มีค่าปฏิบัติการควบคุมการขายทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและผลิตภัณฑ์ (Wenar 2010) เมื่อผู้บริโภคในอเมริการวยซื้อสินค้าจากประเทศกำลังพัฒนา นี่คือมักจะคล้ายกับสติรับของโจร ทรัพยากรที่ถูกต้องตามกฎหมายขายต้องตกลงจากประชาชนทั่วไป หลักฐานของข้อตกลงจำเป็นต้อง: (i) เจ้าของที่ต้องทราบเกี่ยวกับการขาย (ii) เจ้าของต้องการด่วน dissent อิสระควรมีข้อสงสัยเกี่ยวกับการขาย และ (iii) เจ้าของควรจะหยุดการขายทรัพยากรโดยไม่กลัวผลที่ตามมาจนรุนแรงและข่มขู่ ในเรื่องเหล่านี้วิธี Wenar มุ่งการแย่งทรัพยากรของประชาชนนอกกฎหมายเหตุผลต่าง ๆ (รวมทั้งกลยุทธ์) Thomas Pogge และบิ Wenar ไม่ตรงท้าทายขวาประเทศทรัพยากรเองในเขตแดนของตน แนะนำนโยบาย เช่น มักมากจะมีประสิทธิภาพถ้าสามารถพอภายในโครงสร้างหลักของการประชุมระหว่างประเทศ อย่างไรก็ตาม theorists อื่น ๆ เกิดขึ้นปัญหานี้รวมทั้ง Hillel Steiner, Hayward ทิม และ Mathias Risse สไตเนอร์จนว่า ประชากรทั้งหมดของโลกจะได้รับหุ้นเท่ากับมูลค่าของที่ดินทั้งหมด และเขาสนับสนุนสำหรับการ "กองทุนโลก" ซึ่งมีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อให้แน่ใจว่า เท่าที่ใช้ร่วมกันให้สามารถมีความปลอดภัย กองทุนโลกจะเป็นบ้านหักบัญชีสำหรับการชำระเงินและรายจ่าย (Steiner 2005)Appealing to accounts of ownership of resources, some philosophers draw out important implications for diverse global justice debates. Mathias Risse argues that we all, collectively, own the resources of the earth and this has profound implications for a range of global justice issues, including immigration. When people are under-utilizing their “rightful shares” of territory, they cannot complain when co-owners would like to occupy some of it. Some theorists concerned with environmental issues also discuss our rights with respect to natural resources. Some argue that we have equal rights to access the earth’s resources. Tim Hayward, for instance, argues that we have equal rights to ecological space (Hayward 2005). This is often appealed to when there is a perception that we have exceeded our share, such as in levels of carbon emissions and consumption more generally.Accounts according to which we have equal rights to resources, land, ecological space and so on, are often accused of suffering from an important common problem. It is difficult to defend a clear and compelling account of the value of resources as these can vary considerably in different social, cultural and technological contexts. But we need to be able to quantify resource values to some plausible extent, if we are to determine whether people are enjoying or exceeding their equal shares.9.2 Allocating Responsibilities for Global ProblemsThere are a number of global justice problems that require remedying, and this raises the issue of remedial responsibilities. Who should do what to reduce global injustices? Several different agents, groups, organizations and institutions could play a role. Which responsibilities should devolve to corporations, governments, consumers, citizens, international organizations or social movements? Several guidelines that are often discussed include issues concerning the contribution agents have made to a problem, their patterns of benefit from the problem, and their capacity to take constructive action now. Two influential frameworks deserve more extended treatment, notably that of Iris Marion Young concerning a social connection model for allocating responsibilities for structural injustice and that of David Miller concerning remedial responsibility (Young 2011, Miller 2007).In contrast to the idea of responsibility as involving finding fault and individual liability, Iris Marion Young develops a forward-looking model which she argues is more appropriate. She draws on the idea that participation via institutions sometimes produces injustice, so we have particular responsibilities to address injustice. We share responsibility for remedying injustice but we may have different degrees and kinds of responsibility. She offers different parameters of reasoning that can help individuals and organizations decide what might make the most sense for them to do in efforts to remedy injustice, given that there are so many injustices, whereas time and resources are limited. Using the case study of the global apparel industry she illustrates how the fact that we are positioned differently can entail varying but important responsibilities for all who participate in activities that sustain sweatshops. There are at least four parameters that agents can use in their reasoning:
Power: we have different levels of influence and capacities to change processes. We should focus on those areas where we have greater capacities to change worrisome structural processes. This might mean focusing on a few key players who have both greater capacity to make changes themselves and to influence others.
Privilege: some people have more privilege than others in relation to structures. So middle-class clothing consumers have more discretionary income, choice and ability to absorb costs—they can change their clothing purchasing practices more easily than those who earn minimum wage, have little discretionary income, and little ability to absorb further costs.
Interest: All who have an interest in changing oppressive structures have responsibilities in connection with remedying these. This entails that “victims” too have important responsibilities since they have a great interest in eliminating oppression. In a nuanced analysis she argues that they might have responsibilities in certain contexts, such as to speak out about the harsh conditions in which they work. They must take some responsibility for resisting and challenging the structures. Without their participation the need for reforms may be rationalized away or reforms may not take the required form. These obligations may not always exist, especially when the costs of resistance would require extraordinary sacrifices.
Collective ability: In some cases we already have collective organization capacities and resources that are well established. Sometimes it just makes good practical sense to draw on these. So, for instance, sometimes student associations, faith-based organizations, unions, or stockholder groups already exercise significant power in being able to coordinate like-minded members who are willing to take certain actions. She encourages us to harness organizational resources where doing so would prove effective.
In summary, Young encourages us to think about how we can best take responsibility for reducing structural injustice by reflecting on these four parameters—different positions of power, privilege, interest and collective ability.
David Miller offers a tremendously influential connection theory of responsibility that also discusses our remedial responsibilities. There are six ways in which we can be connected to someone, P, who needs help and so be held remedially responsible for assisting. These connections give rise to six ways in which remedial responsibility can be identified. We might be morally responsible for P’s condition; we might be outcome or causally responsible for P’s condition; we might have had no causal role in their condition but have benefited from it; we might have capacity to assist P; or we might be connected to P through ties of community.[4]
In the global justice literature there are also important concerns about the distribution of responsibilities among collective and individual agents. Prominently, can we hold nations responsible for global injustices or remedying such injustices? This raises important questions about collective responsibility that are well treated elsewhere in this encyclopedia (see the entry on collective responsibility.
9.3 Authority in the Global Domain: Do We Need a World State to Secure Global Justice?
Is it possible to have global justice in the absence of a world state? Hobbes argues that this is not possible since there is no global authority that can sec
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