We also found strong evidence that dyadic characteristics explain BITs+ BITs
are much more likely to be negotiated among country pairs of the same culture ~at
least as measured by shared language! and among country pairs with strong security
commitments+ But if cultural linkages explain home-host pairs, cultural emulation
is much less in evidence among potential hosts+ Not one indicator of cultural
emulation among hosts had any purchase at all on the adoption of BITs+ These
cultural arguments may in the end be a more satisfying account available for the
growing category of “strange BITs” between highly indebted, capital-poor, noncontiguous
country pairs+ We know anecdotally that third parties ~France,
UNCTAD! facilitated many of these agreements, indicating that in many cases
external political or cultural forces may be crucial+ The strong positive effect of
IMF borrowing and alliance relationships on the propensity to sign a BIT also
reminds us that a certain degree of coercion may be at play in some cases+