Regulation ATS: The Commission’s Response to Electronic Trading Technology
In adopting the 1975 Amendments to the Securities Laws, Congress gave the Commission the authority to facilitate developing a national market system for securities. Not just equities, mind you, but all types, including fixed income securities. Congress recognized that many of the goals of a national market system were universal ones, such as transparency of quote and trade information, giving investors the opportunity for best execution, self-regulatory coordination, and strengthening Commission oversight of the markets.
At the same time, Congress made clear that it didn’t intend for the Commission to force all securities markets into a single mold. The Commission was to classify markets and take into account the differences among them in achieving the goals of a national market system.
As I alluded to earlier, over the years the Association has gently, yet insistently, reminded the Commission that the fixed income markets aren’t the same as the equity markets. The Association has cautioned the Commission against imposing equity market principles on bond market structure and the Commission has benefited from the Association’s input.
While the Commission has benefited from the Association’s input, from my perspective, we’ve exercised our national market system authority very much in accord with Congress’s intent. When we’ve used it, we’ve done so to pursue the universal national market system goals I mentioned earlier. We’ve accomplished these goals with the differences among markets in mind.
Regulation ATS shows how the Commission has responded to a challenge facing all markets while respecting the differences among them. The regulatory dilemma presented by alternative trading systems is the same for systems that trade equities and fixed-income securities. ATSs are private, for-profit entities that perform the functions of exchanges, but have been regulated as broker-dealers.
While broker-dealer regulation was insufficient to ensure the appropriate oversight of ATSs, the Commission was able to keep a more or less adequate ad hoc regulatory regime in place by supplementing it through conditions on the "exchange" no-action letters we issued to ATSs. Obviously, this approach was not going to provide a coherent long-term regulatory scheme to guide the future growth of ATSs.
What really made this approach untenable, however, was technology. Developments in electronic trading technology have made ATSs dependable and cost-effective trading venues. As a result, they have been able to wrest an ever-increasing amount of trading volume from traditional markets. As I mentioned earlier, technology has dramatically decreased the costs of entry for new ATSs, which is why we’re seeing new systems pop up all the time.
In adopting Regulation ATS, the Commission crafted a solution broad enough to address the challenge ATSs posed to the securities markets generally, but one sufficiently tailored to take into account the distinctions among different markets.
All ATSs have to: (1) register as broker-dealers; (2) become SRO members; (3) file a Form ATS, keep it updated, and submit quarterly volume reports; (4) cooperate with Commission and SRO inspections; (5) maintain certain records; (6) keep trading information confidential; and (7) refrain from calling themselves "exchanges" or "stock markets." This is hardly an onerous regulatory regime -- for any type of security.
Additional requirements apply to high-volume ATSs. Those trading equities have to provide their best-priced buy and sell orders to an SRO and give non-subscribers access to those orders on reasonable terms. These requirements reflect market structure concerns peculiar to the equities markets. In addition, high-volume equity and fixed-income ATSs have to comply with fair access standards and systems capacity requirements. The volume calculations reflect distinctions between equity and fixed-income markets. Volume levels are set security-by-security for equities, and by category for fixed-income securities.
As you can see, Regulation ATS is not a "one-size fits all" approach to the regulatory challenge posed by electronic trading technology. It is a measured approach, meant to provide the regulatory certainty necessary to encourage new entrants to introduce innovative trading systems in the equity and fixed-income markets alike.
Even with Regulation ATS in place, a number of significant market structure issues still need to be resolved. One of the most pressing, and certainly among the most important, is that of for-profit exchanges. Three entities have already filed applications to register as exchanges with for-profit structures. The NYSE and NASD are considering demutualizing and going public (or at least private) sometime next year.
One of the most difficult issues raised by for-profit exchanges is whether they can adequately carry out their self-regulatory responsibilities. Does a for-profit exchange have the proper incentives to dedicate sufficient resources to the regulatory function? Is there too much of a potential conflict of interest in a for-profit exchange regulating its owners? What about potential conflicts in regulating market participants who also may be a for-profit exchange’s competitors? In answering these questions, the Commission needs to consider whether the current SRO model is appropriate or if we need to partially or completely separate the trading and self-regulatory functions of exchanges. The Commission will seek the industry’s input as we move forward on this vitally important issue.
ควบคุม ATS: ตอบเทคโนโลยีการค้าอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ของสำนักงานคณะกรรมการในการใช้การแก้ไขกฎหมายหลักทรัพย์ 1975 รัฐสภาให้นายอำนาจเพื่ออำนวยความสะดวกพัฒนาระบบแห่งชาติตลาดหลักทรัพย์ ไม่เพียงแต่หุ้น มายด์ แต่รายได้หลักทรัพย์ถาวรทุกชนิด รวมถึง สภารู้ว่า เป้าหมายของระบบตลาดแห่งชาติมากมายถูกคนสากล เช่นความโปร่งใสของข้อมูลใบเสนอราคาและการค้า ให้โอกาสสำหรับการดำเนินการที่ดีที่สุด ประสานงาน self-regulatory และสำนักงานคณะกรรมการกำกับดูแลที่เข้มแข็งในตลาดนักลงทุนรัฐสภาทำไม่ชัดเจนว่า มันไม่ได้ตั้งใจจะให้ตลาดหลักทรัพย์ทั้งหมดเป็นแม่พิมพ์เดียวกัน นายถูกจัดประเภทตลาด และคำนึงถึงความแตกต่างระหว่างพวกเขาในการบรรลุเป้าหมายของระบบตลาดชาติเป็นฉัน alluded ไปก่อนหน้านี้ ปี สมาคมได้เบา ๆ ยัง insistently นายเตือนว่า ตลาดตราสารหนี้ไม่เหมือนกับตลาดหุ้น สมาคมได้เตือนนายกับสถานะหุ้นตลาดหลักในโครงสร้างตลาดตราสารหนี้ และนายได้รับประโยชน์จากการป้อนข้อมูลของสมาคมขณะที่นายได้รับประโยชน์จากการป้อนข้อมูลของสมาคม จากมุมมองของฉัน เราได้ใช้อำนาจของระบบตลาดชาติมากในสอดคล้องกับจุดประสงค์ของสภา เมื่อเราได้ใช้มัน เราได้ทำเพื่อไล่เป้าหมายระบบตลาดสากลชาติ ผมกล่าวถึงก่อนหน้านี้ เราได้สำเร็จเป้าหมายเหล่านี้ มีความแตกต่างระหว่างตลาดในจิตใจระเบียบ ATS แสดงว่านายได้ตอบรับความท้าทายที่หันหน้าไปทางตลาดทั้งหมดในขณะที่เคารพความแตกต่างระหว่างพวกเขา ลำบากใจทางที่นำเสนอ โดยระบบการค้าอื่นเป็นเหมือนกันสำหรับระบบที่ค้าหุ้นและหลักทรัพย์ตรา ATSs ตี for-profit ส่วน ที่ทำหน้าที่แลกเปลี่ยน มีการควบคุมเป็นนายหน้าตัวแทนจำหน่าย ได้ในขณะที่ระเบียบนายหน้าตัวแทนจำหน่ายไม่เพียงพอเพื่อให้การกำกับดูแลที่เหมาะสม ATSs นายก็สามารถที่จะรักษาระบอบกิจกำกับดูแลเพียงพอมากน้อยในตำแหน่ง โดยใช้ผ่านเงื่อนไขการ "แลกเปลี่ยน" การดำเนินการไม่มีตัวอักษรเราออกให้ ATSs อย่างชัดเจน วิธีการนี้ถูกไม่ไปให้ coherent ระยะยาวกำกับดูแลแผนเพื่อเป็นแนวทางการเติบโตในอนาคตของ ATSsWhat really made this approach untenable, however, was technology. Developments in electronic trading technology have made ATSs dependable and cost-effective trading venues. As a result, they have been able to wrest an ever-increasing amount of trading volume from traditional markets. As I mentioned earlier, technology has dramatically decreased the costs of entry for new ATSs, which is why we’re seeing new systems pop up all the time.In adopting Regulation ATS, the Commission crafted a solution broad enough to address the challenge ATSs posed to the securities markets generally, but one sufficiently tailored to take into account the distinctions among different markets.All ATSs have to: (1) register as broker-dealers; (2) become SRO members; (3) file a Form ATS, keep it updated, and submit quarterly volume reports; (4) cooperate with Commission and SRO inspections; (5) maintain certain records; (6) keep trading information confidential; and (7) refrain from calling themselves "exchanges" or "stock markets." This is hardly an onerous regulatory regime -- for any type of security.Additional requirements apply to high-volume ATSs. Those trading equities have to provide their best-priced buy and sell orders to an SRO and give non-subscribers access to those orders on reasonable terms. These requirements reflect market structure concerns peculiar to the equities markets. In addition, high-volume equity and fixed-income ATSs have to comply with fair access standards and systems capacity requirements. The volume calculations reflect distinctions between equity and fixed-income markets. Volume levels are set security-by-security for equities, and by category for fixed-income securities.As you can see, Regulation ATS is not a "one-size fits all" approach to the regulatory challenge posed by electronic trading technology. It is a measured approach, meant to provide the regulatory certainty necessary to encourage new entrants to introduce innovative trading systems in the equity and fixed-income markets alike.Even with Regulation ATS in place, a number of significant market structure issues still need to be resolved. One of the most pressing, and certainly among the most important, is that of for-profit exchanges. Three entities have already filed applications to register as exchanges with for-profit structures. The NYSE and NASD are considering demutualizing and going public (or at least private) sometime next year.One of the most difficult issues raised by for-profit exchanges is whether they can adequately carry out their self-regulatory responsibilities. Does a for-profit exchange have the proper incentives to dedicate sufficient resources to the regulatory function? Is there too much of a potential conflict of interest in a for-profit exchange regulating its owners? What about potential conflicts in regulating market participants who also may be a for-profit exchange’s competitors? In answering these questions, the Commission needs to consider whether the current SRO model is appropriate or if we need to partially or completely separate the trading and self-regulatory functions of exchanges. The Commission will seek the industry’s input as we move forward on this vitally important issue.
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