Weaknesses in the Asian Economies?
The first, and originally the most widely-held view, was that the crisis was entirely due to
deficiencies within the Asian economies themselves. In this view, these weaknesses had been
small enough to be overlooked in the early 1990s, but became much larger and more obvious in
1996 and early 1997. This change led to a sudden fundamental shift in perceptions about the
outlook for continued growth, and a rapid withdrawal of financing.
As we have argued previously, there is little doubt that there were growing problems in
each of the Asian crisis economies, that in a way could be understood as side effects of the
region=s very successes. Many of the problems had their origins in financial liberalization
policies introduced in each of the crisis economies in the late 1980s and early 1990s that led to a
very rapid expansion of the financial sector, and enthusiastic lending by foreign creditors. Entry
requirements into financial services were loosened, allowing new private banks to open. Banks
were given much greater leeway in their lending decisions, and stock and bond markets began to
grow and develop. Importantly, banks and financial institutions had new freedoms to raise funds
offshore. New institutions were developed, such as the Bangkok International Banking Facility
(BIBF) that were designed to offer new financial services and attract investment, and were
actively encouraged to borrow offshore to finance their activities. This combination led to a rapid
expansion in both offshore borrowing and domestic lending, with a resulting investment boom.
Bank claims on the private sector increased by more than 50% relative to GDP in just seven
years in Thailand, Korea, and Malaysia.
The financial liberalization directly contributed to the buildup in foreign capital flows,
since much of the domestic credit expansion was financed by domestic banks and other financial
institutions borrowing offshore. In Thailand, for example, the foreign liabilities of banks and
financial institutions rose from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 28% of GDP in 1995. Korean merchant
banks borrowed heavily offshore, and then lent the funds to large corporations (chaebols), which
became very heavily leveraged by 1997 (Borensztein and Lee, 1998). It is worthwhile noting,
however, that in Indonesia, credit growth in the financial sector was more modest, as Indonesian
corporations borrowed directly offshore. Nonetheless, the Indonesian corporate sector itself
became vulnerable to offshore panic, a point that was painfully proved in late 1997 when the
corporate debts were suddenly called in by foreign creditors.