2.2.2 Information on Organizational

2.2.2 Information on Organizational Performance
Even if public agencies are monopolists, bureaucratic behaviour doesn’t necessarily
need to have negative consequences if it can be monitored and controlled. Close
scrutiny and effective management could, in principle, lead to organizational activities
that promote the public interest. The problem, according to public choice theory, is
that there are no unambiguous indicators of performance in the public sector, so it is
difficult to evaluate or influence the behaviour of agencies or individuals. Niskanen
(1971) notes that bureaucrats and their political sponsors who allocate public funds
are in a position of bilateral monopoly, which would appear to allocate equal power
on each side. However, officials are more powerful than politicians because of the
difficulty of measuring service outputs and costs. Niskanen (1971) argues that only
the bureaucrats know the true cost of delivering the level of output desired by their
political sponsor. It is, therefore, easy for officials to persuade politicians to allocate
more money than is really required for service provision. By contrast, bureaucrats are
able to make an accurate guess about the maximum funds that politicians are prepared
to provide for a given level of service activities.
Taken together, the selfishness and monopoly power of public officials result in a
number of negative effects on the production of public services. Over time, the
interests of the bureaucrats themselves become more and more important in justifying
the organization. Although all organizations have inherent tendencies towards
expansion, this phenomenon is especially pronounced in the public sector where the
ability to obtain income in a market cannot serve as an objective guide to the
desirability of extending, maintaining or contracting the level of expenditures it
undertakes. The inability of bureaus to rely on markets as objective indicators of
output value affects their operation.

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 1:

2.2.2 Information on Organizational PerformanceEven if public agencies are monopolists, bureaucratic behaviour doesn’t necessarilyneed to have negative consequences if it can be monitored and controlled. Closescrutiny and effective management could, in principle, lead to organizational activitiesthat promote the public interest. The problem, according to public choice theory, isthat there are no unambiguous indicators of performance in the public sector, so it isdifficult to evaluate or influence the behaviour of agencies or individuals. Niskanen(1971) notes that bureaucrats and their political sponsors who allocate public fundsare in a position of bilateral monopoly, which would appear to allocate equal poweron each side. However, officials are more powerful than politicians because of thedifficulty of measuring service outputs and costs. Niskanen (1971) argues that onlythe bureaucrats know the true cost of delivering the level of output desired by theirpolitical sponsor. It is, therefore, easy for officials to persuade politicians to allocatemore money than is really required for service provision. By contrast, bureaucrats areable to make an accurate guess about the maximum funds that politicians are preparedto provide for a given level of service activities.Taken together, the selfishness and monopoly power of public officials result in anumber of negative effects on the production of public services. Over time, theประโยชน์ของ bureaucrats เองเป็นสิ่งสำคัญมากใน justifyingองค์กร แม้ว่าองค์กรทั้งหมดมีแนวโน้มโดยธรรมชาติต่อขยาย ปรากฏการณ์นี้โดยเฉพาะออกเสียงว่า ในภาครัฐที่จะความสามารถในการรับรายได้ในตลาดไม่สามารถทำหน้าที่เป็นการแนะนำวัตถุประสงค์ปรารถนา ของขยาย รักษาระดับของค่าใช้จ่ายทำสัญญานั้นรับ ไม่ bureaus พึ่งตลาดเป็นตัวชี้วัดวัตถุประสงค์ของค่าเอาท์พุทมีผลต่อการทำงานของ