As the April 1992 opening approached, the company launched a massive cations aimed accessible to all Europeans. the fact that from was now media were lavishly Some 2,500 people various print and broadcast siastic people were entertained while being to the new facilities. Most by some for of positively impressed with the inauguration and with the enthu the These public As 1992 being heavy-handed and for not were criticized wound down after providing access to Disney executives. the opening, it became clear that revenue projec- tions were, unbelievably. not being met. But the opening turned out to be in the middle of a severe recession in Europe. European visitors, perhaps as a conse quence, were far more frugal than their American counterparts. Many packed their own lunches and shunned the Disney hotels. For example, a visitor named Corine from southern France the "mo spend" attitude of many: "It's a pit," she said as she, her husband, and their three children toured Euro Disney on a three-day visit. "Every time we turn around, one of the kids wants to buy some thing." Perhaps investor expectations, despite the logic and rationale, were simply unrealistic. Indeed, Disney had initially priced the park and the hotels to meet revenue targets and assumed demand was there at any price. Park was s42.25 for adults higher than at the American parks. A room at the flagship Disneyland Hotel at the park's entrance cost about $340 a night, the equivalent of a top hotel in Paris. It was soon averaging only a 50 percent occupancy. Guests were not staying as long or spending as much on the fairly high-priced food and merchandise. We can label the initial pricing strategy at Euro Disney as skimming pricing, The following Information Box discusses skimming and its opposite, penetration pricing Disney executives soon realized they had made a major miscalculation. While visitors to Florida's Disney World often than four days, Euro Disney with one theme park to Florida's three-was proving to be a two-day