The Outlook
The general consensus is that while the currency crisis will have serious short-term consequences for the economy's involved, it will only be a bump in the road for the United States and the European economies. The days of rapid economic growth for Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have come to at least a temporary end. Recession is the likely scenario for these countries in 1998 and perhaps 1999. China, Taiwan, Japan and other Asian countries see slower growth since their currencies have remained relatively stable and as a result their exports are now less competitive than those from the countries directly involved in the currency crisis.
The optimists point out that although 44% of Japan’s exports go to Asia, 30% of America’s and 9% of the European Union’s, measured by a more relevant yardstick, exports to Asia account for only 4.4% of Japan’s GDP, 3.4% of America’s and 2.7% of the EU’s. If Asian imports fall by an average of 15% next year, a greater amount than the fall in imports during Mexico’s currency crisis in 1995, America’s GDP growth would be reduced by half a percentage point and the European Union’s by four-tenths of a point. Some claim that the U.S. economy was close to reaching a point of higher inflation and thus the Asian currency crisis was perfectly timed to reduce American inflationary pressures and eliminate the need for the Federal Reserve to increase interest rates.
The pessimistic viewpoint emphasizes several factors.
The impact on the directly affected Asian countries may be underestimated and things could turn out much worse. Asian businesses are just beginning to feel the effects of the currency crisis. During the early part of 1998, firms will be unable to raise money and hold a fire sale on their products to make payments on their debt. When this is not enough, Asian banks will have to call in loans and foreclose on collateral associated with bad debts. Then lay-offs and bankruptcies will soar. Falling prices and a substantial and prolonged recession in South Korea could have a greater than anticipated impact on Japan, Taiwan and China.
By itself, Japan faces tremendous financial problems and a likely massive banking bailout that seriously inhibits economic growth for several years. Thirteen of the 19 biggest Japanese banks expect to report losses this year as a result of writing off bad loans. A deepening Japanese recession will significantly impact American and European firms that export to Japan.
Multinationals are more exposed to Asia than export figures suggest. There are estimates that Asia, excluding Japan, accounts for 7% of the revenues of listed European firms, about twice the region’s share of Europe’s overall exports.
The OutlookThe general consensus is that while the currency crisis will have serious short-term consequences for the economy's involved, it will only be a bump in the road for the United States and the European economies. The days of rapid economic growth for Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have come to at least a temporary end. Recession is the likely scenario for these countries in 1998 and perhaps 1999. China, Taiwan, Japan and other Asian countries see slower growth since their currencies have remained relatively stable and as a result their exports are now less competitive than those from the countries directly involved in the currency crisis.The optimists point out that although 44% of Japan’s exports go to Asia, 30% of America’s and 9% of the European Union’s, measured by a more relevant yardstick, exports to Asia account for only 4.4% of Japan’s GDP, 3.4% of America’s and 2.7% of the EU’s. If Asian imports fall by an average of 15% next year, a greater amount than the fall in imports during Mexico’s currency crisis in 1995, America’s GDP growth would be reduced by half a percentage point and the European Union’s by four-tenths of a point. Some claim that the U.S. economy was close to reaching a point of higher inflation and thus the Asian currency crisis was perfectly timed to reduce American inflationary pressures and eliminate the need for the Federal Reserve to increase interest rates.The pessimistic viewpoint emphasizes several factors.The impact on the directly affected Asian countries may be underestimated and things could turn out much worse. Asian businesses are just beginning to feel the effects of the currency crisis. During the early part of 1998, firms will be unable to raise money and hold a fire sale on their products to make payments on their debt. When this is not enough, Asian banks will have to call in loans and foreclose on collateral associated with bad debts. Then lay-offs and bankruptcies will soar. Falling prices and a substantial and prolonged recession in South Korea could have a greater than anticipated impact on Japan, Taiwan and China. By itself, Japan faces tremendous financial problems and a likely massive banking bailout that seriously inhibits economic growth for several years. Thirteen of the 19 biggest Japanese banks expect to report losses this year as a result of writing off bad loans. A deepening Japanese recession will significantly impact American and European firms that export to Japan. Multinationals are more exposed to Asia than export figures suggest. There are estimates that Asia, excluding Japan, accounts for 7% of the revenues of listed European firms, about twice the region’s share of Europe’s overall exports.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
