This juxtaposing of reductivist and retributivist theories of punishment may seem something of a false dichotomy because, it may be argued, the purpose of defining some sorts of behaviour as crime is surely to reduce their occurrence. If the purpose of criminal law is to prevent or curtail the actions that society regards as harmful enough to be criminalized, then by definition judicial punishment, as the system of penalties for transgressing the criminal law, must share this goal of reducing crime. If we wish to encourage a certain type of behaviour, we do not make it the subject of a criminal law and provide penalties for its commission. If we would like more members of society to do. something - join the armed forces, or look after their elderly neighbours, for example - we run media campaigns emphasizing its importance and merit, we increase or introduce payments, we award medals. It is when we want to discourage something - theft, killing, assaults, incitement to racial hatred - that we make it a 'crime. There are, of course, other forms of behaviour which society or particular social groups might want to discourage - taking a day's unofficial holiday after the New Year festivities, bearing children outside marriage, eating meat - but although these may be disapproved behaviours, they are not crimes. If we try to distinguish 'crimes' and other forms of disapproved behaviour by characteristics of the actions themselves (being harmful to other people, for example), we would soon find ourselves in difficulties. The way criminologists and others usually distinguish between crimes and other forms of disapproved conduct is to say that crimes are those kinds of conduct which are proscribed by the criminal law, and for which there IS provision for state punishment.