n fact, under Sisi, the same economic model that prevailed under Mubarak has been re-created to a great extent. The new regime’s policy changes have been targeted exclusively toward big business and foreign—namely Gulf Arab—investors. Meanwhile, subsidies for the general population have been slashed, without offsetting social policies to mitigate the higher prices that ordinary Egyptians now face. The regime has shown a general inability or unwillingness to introduce progressive taxation on property and capital holders, which would make it possible to redistribute income and improve the quality of public services in areas such as healthcare and education.
With that, the same patterns of social and economic marginalization that existed before the 2011 revolution are being reproduced. While the Egyptian economy grew at an impressive rate during the last years of Mubarak’s rule, little of that trickled down to the broad base of the population. Unemployment skyrocketed. Inflation led to the erosion of real wages for the middle classes and the urban poor. All these factors only aggravated Egypt’s social conflict and exacerbated the political crisis that confronted Mubarak.
To be sure, Egypt’s military-backed regime also faces problems that are not directly related to the country’s economic condition. These are tied to ongoing efforts to establish a functional political system with the capacity to represent various societal interests, create an intermediate political class to populate the parliament and local government, and contain political Islam. There is little doubt that economic conditions would impact the options available to the regime in dealing with these challenges. However, it is far too economistic and reductionist to see them as chiefly economic issues.
Read more at: http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/05/20/economic-recovery-in-egypt-won-t-guarantee-political-stability/i8sm