The main source of inflationary inertia, the automatic indexation of prices, wages and
other contracts, was substantially reduced. Annual output growth averaged 3.4 percent in real
terms in 1994–98, even though unemployment started to rise in 1997.
However, despite its relative success, the stabilization process involved a gradualist
approach toward many structural economic problems that remained unsolved. A much-needed
definitive fiscal adjustment was continually postponed because, in part, the government coalition
was not sufficiently convinced of its urgency. So, Brazil remained vulnerable to a confidence
crisis, which became a reality when the international financial turmoil culminated with the
Russian moratorium in August 1998. The confidence crisis generated a large capital flight from
emerging markets. Brazil raised short-term interest rates and announced a strong tightening of the
fiscal regime. At the same time, the government negotiated a preventive financial support package
with the IMF, totaling US$41.5 billion.
The government was initially successful in implementing the fiscal package, but market
confidence continued to erode up to January 1999, also reflecting concerns over the newly
elected governors’ commitments to adjusting their states public finances. Following strong
pressures on foreign exchange reserves, the Central Bank was forced to abandon the crawling peg
to the dollar.1
After a brief attempt to conduct a controlled devaluation, the real was forced to
float on January 15. As a consequence of this abrupt change in regime, most of the Central
Bank’s Board of Directors was replaced. Due to Brazilian peculiarities, the new Board took office
only in the beginning of March.2
In the absence of a well-defined guidance for monetary policy, the exchange rate
averaged R$1.52/US$1 in January and R$1.91/US$1 in February, compared with R$1.21/US$1
prior to the change in regime. Inflation rose sharply: the wholesale price index increased 7.0
percent in February, while the consumer price index rose 1.4 percent. This led private analysts to
foresee a huge deterioration of all macroeconomic fundamentals.
The new Board took office on March 4th and immediately worked on two main fronts. The
first was to calm down the nervous financial markets. The expectation that an inflation hike could
bring the real rates of return on public debt instruments to the negative range was the first to be
attacked.
1
The official exchange rate policy at that time consisted of an intended nominal devaluation of
7.5 percent p.a., while annual inflation was near 2 percent.
2
In Brazil, the Federal Senate must formally approve the nominees to the Central Bank’s Board.
The process consists of two steps. The first is a preliminary open hearing in the Committee of
Economic Affairs. The second is a discussing and voting session, where the 81 Senators decide
by simple majority whether to approve or reject the nominee. Although the Government coalition
has a large majority in the Senate, the process is time consuming.