Chapter Two
India’s Contacts with GMS
The regional and sub-regional cooperation today is no longer
confined to geographical parameters. The United States, for instance,
remains an integral member of several Southeast Asian forums. But
when it comes to India’s engagement with what is now called the GMS,
their geographical linkages and therefore cultural homogeneity is not a
mere construction of their political perceptions. It has been established
without doubt that India and GMS share long geological history, the
unfolding youngest mountain ranges and the same monsoon rhythm
which has resulted in shared needs, values, rituals and cultures.14
The political distortion of this historical reality was to intervene
only from the fact that India and Indochina were to be colonized by
separate (British and French) powers and this was to result in their
political segregation, undermining their continuum of cultures and
interdependence of their communities since ancient times. The British,
for instance, were to enforce their boundaries between Burma and Siam
based on their security and economic (timber) interests.15 But such acts
were to only further facilitate contacts between the liberation movements
amongst these colonized people keeping their bonds alive. What remains
of critical significance today is that this historical experience makes both
Indian and Indochinese people extremely comfortable with each other
and this remains the starting as well as central point of India’s current
engagement with the GMS countries.
1 - Shared Experience, Common Values
The contemporary phase of this long story of India’s contacts with
the GMS countries begins from India’s freedom movement which had
MEKONG-GANGA COOPERATION INITIATIVE
18
triggered the beginning of the end of European colonialism in this part
of Asia. Leaders of de-colonization movements – like Gandhi or Ho Chi
Minh – were not just fighting for the national liberation but liberation of
Asian people. This was to make India appear as if spearheading a larger
de-colonization and development pursuit for this larger region. Indeed,
contacts and correspondence of Indian leaders with some of Indochina
leaders go back to the 1920’s. Much before India became a formally
independent country, Ho Chi Minh (in Vietnam) had dispatched an
emissary to the Indian capital to seek assistance against the French and
Sukarno had appealed to Nehru for help against the British occupation
in Indonesia.16
Though contacts between India and Indochina* had not been far too
many compared to, say, those with some other countries like Indonesia
or Myanmar yet, in 1928, Doung Van Gieu (a Viet Namese nationalist)
had been invited by Jawaharlal Nehru of the Indian National Congress
(INC) to their party’s historic annual session in Calcutta.17 Similarly, four
months before India’s independence in August 1947, India had
convened an Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April 1947.
This was attended by nationalists from 25 Asian nations to explore
avenues for further cooperation including their freedom struggle.
Amongst others, this was attended by a special representative of Dr. Ho
Chi Minh in Viet Nam.
After the New Delhi Asian Relations Conference and before India’s
independence (i.e. between April and August 1947), the Government of
India, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru, had already imposed restrictions on
over-flights of aircraft carrying arms and ammunition for use by the
colonial masters against the freedom fighters in Indochina. This policy
may have had some contribution in ensuring the historic French
reversals in Dien Bien Phu which were to lead to the Geneva Conference
* This traditional expression called Indochina was used to describe this region of people
around the Mekong River. This has often been described by various names as Suvanna
Phumi, Swarnabhoomi, Mekong basin, or sometimes merged into the larger reality of
Southeast Asia. From the early 1990, ADB has tried to evolve this category of Greater
Mekong Sub-region (GMS) as important multilateral regional framework for sustainable
development of these countries.
INDIA’S CONTACTS WITH GMS
19
of 1954. For sure, the international community recognized India’s role
and this was to herald another phase in India’s relations with Indochina.
India was not only invited to the Geneva negotiations but, given its
vigorous role, it was entrusted with (along with Canada and Poland) the
responsibility to oversee implementation of Geneva Agreement.18 As
indicator of their bilateral ties and to give boost to their inter-State
cooperation, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had visited Viet
Nam during 1954 and President Ho Chi Minh had reciprocated with a
visit to India in 1958.
From that perspective, India’s engagement with Indochina had
flourished much before its engagement with ASEAN or even before the
creation of ASEAN in 1967. To recall, India was one of the several
countries to extend economic and technical assistance to the Lower
Mekong Project under the aegis of the Mekong Committee (1957)
comprising of the four riparian counties, namely, Cambodia, Laos, South
Vietnam and Thailand.19 These pioneering experiments at developing
Mekong region were to be described as a model in multilateralism and
sub-regional cooperation and as “Marshall Plan for Mekong”.20 The
Mekong Basin Project, as also India’s ties with Indochina, were to soon
fall prey to Cold War dynamics. Especially for India, the Afro-Asian
Conference of Bandung (Indonesia) was to mark the peak of India’s
engagement with this region. Later, India’s war with China (1962)
followed by death of India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and
China’s atomic test (both in 1964) were to shrink India’s foreign policy
interests for the next three decades, if not more.21
2 - India’s ‘Look East’ Policy Redefined
It was only from the early 1990’s that India’s economic reforms
were to trigger its well-known ‘Look-East’ policy and this was to revive
India’s interest in Indo-China. This was also to lead to India
reformulating its worldview on various economic and political issues as
also about its strategic space that was now defined as Southern Asia,
including the GMS.22 Similarly, opening up and reforms of GMS and
induction of these countries into ASEAN during the later half of the
1990’s was to create necessary atmospherics for the India-GMS
MEKONG-GANGA COOPERATION INITIATIVE
20
rapprochement that had once so flourished during the 1950’s. The success
of India’s Look East policy with the original six of ASEAN, and the
appreciation amongst those original six of ASEAN that Indochina
required special attention for economic and social development, was to
greatly facilitate India’s engagement with GMS.23 Indeed, India was to
define its niche vis-à-vis GMS from the perspective of (a) being a partner
in Integration of ASEAN Initiative (IAI) of year 2000, and (b) on the basis
of India’s historical and cultural links with he GMS people. This was to
greatly facilitate India’s engagement with GMS and this second phase of
their rapprochement was to include several new fields like resource
management, technology and science, trade and commerce and also the
education and health sectors.24
India’s larger ‘Look East’ policy had been an attempt to diversify
India’s diplomacy as well as realize its new post-liberalization economic
engagement with its ‘extended neighborhood’ in Southeast Asia. So, in
its first phase during the early 1990’s, this had remained focused on six,
richer members of ASEAN and initiatives primarily in building
economic engagement. Induction of four GMS countries into ASEAN
was to transform focus for both ASEAN and India. Starting from the
mid-1990’s, this has witnessed India accelerating pace of its cooperation
in a tailor-made fashion with Singapore, Myanmar, Viet Nam, Cambodia
with over all China-India rapprochement providing the positive
atmospherics. Amongst the GMS countries, Thailand was the first to take
a major lead towards building a comprehensive economic and security
partnership with India.25 As a result, India-Thailand trade has not only
increased from USD1.1 billion to USD3.4 billion during 2001-2006 but
India’s total share in Thailand’s foreign trade has also increased from
0.85 per cent to 1.06 percent during this period.26
In January 2007, for instance, India’s Minister of State in the
Ministry of External Affairs, E. Ahmad, was to describe Mekong-Ganga
Cooperation Initiative (MGCI) as pillar of India’s Look East policy and
the one which especially facilitated a ‘strategic shift’ in India’s vision of
the world which he called, “from engaging in trade to engaging India’s
civilizational neighbors.”27 According to strategic analysts in India, the
GMS states also see India as a source of assurance especially in balancing
INDIA’S CONTACTS WITH GMS
21
their neighboring giant, China.28 In the 1990’s, therefore, duly
encouraged by some ASEAN countries, India’s overall military
cooperation has also heralded a new chapter of joint exercises and
cooperation with the naval/air forces of ASEAN, including Thailand
and Viet Nam from the GMS. This process was to begin much before the
MGCI and, in 1995, naval diplomatic initiative near the Andamans had
involved navies of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand and the exercises included symbolic search and
rescue operations at sea and exploring inter-operability.29
Indeed, regionalism and rise of China [as also India] have been the
two new trends in Asia which have been both appreciated and endorsed
by GMS deliberations that describe these trends presenting both
challenge and new opportunities for the GMS. Recognizing India as
emerging “economic powerhouse in Asia”, ASEAN has already signed,
in 2003, a framework agreement for ASEAN-India Regional Trade and
Investment Area which includes an FTA in goods, services and
investments. This is envisioned to become operat
Chapter Two
India’s Contacts with GMS
The regional and sub-regional cooperation today is no longer
confined to geographical parameters. The United States, for instance,
remains an integral member of several Southeast Asian forums. But
when it comes to India’s engagement with what is now called the GMS,
their geographical linkages and therefore cultural homogeneity is not a
mere construction of their political perceptions. It has been established
without doubt that India and GMS share long geological history, the
unfolding youngest mountain ranges and the same monsoon rhythm
which has resulted in shared needs, values, rituals and cultures.14
The political distortion of this historical reality was to intervene
only from the fact that India and Indochina were to be colonized by
separate (British and French) powers and this was to result in their
political segregation, undermining their continuum of cultures and
interdependence of their communities since ancient times. The British,
for instance, were to enforce their boundaries between Burma and Siam
based on their security and economic (timber) interests.15 But such acts
were to only further facilitate contacts between the liberation movements
amongst these colonized people keeping their bonds alive. What remains
of critical significance today is that this historical experience makes both
Indian and Indochinese people extremely comfortable with each other
and this remains the starting as well as central point of India’s current
engagement with the GMS countries.
1 - Shared Experience, Common Values
The contemporary phase of this long story of India’s contacts with
the GMS countries begins from India’s freedom movement which had
MEKONG-GANGA COOPERATION INITIATIVE
18
triggered the beginning of the end of European colonialism in this part
of Asia. Leaders of de-colonization movements – like Gandhi or Ho Chi
Minh – were not just fighting for the national liberation but liberation of
Asian people. This was to make India appear as if spearheading a larger
de-colonization and development pursuit for this larger region. Indeed,
contacts and correspondence of Indian leaders with some of Indochina
leaders go back to the 1920’s. Much before India became a formally
independent country, Ho Chi Minh (in Vietnam) had dispatched an
emissary to the Indian capital to seek assistance against the French and
Sukarno had appealed to Nehru for help against the British occupation
in Indonesia.16
Though contacts between India and Indochina* had not been far too
many compared to, say, those with some other countries like Indonesia
or Myanmar yet, in 1928, Doung Van Gieu (a Viet Namese nationalist)
had been invited by Jawaharlal Nehru of the Indian National Congress
(INC) to their party’s historic annual session in Calcutta.17 Similarly, four
months before India’s independence in August 1947, India had
convened an Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April 1947.
This was attended by nationalists from 25 Asian nations to explore
avenues for further cooperation including their freedom struggle.
Amongst others, this was attended by a special representative of Dr. Ho
Chi Minh in Viet Nam.
After the New Delhi Asian Relations Conference and before India’s
independence (i.e. between April and August 1947), the Government of
India, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru, had already imposed restrictions on
over-flights of aircraft carrying arms and ammunition for use by the
colonial masters against the freedom fighters in Indochina. This policy
may have had some contribution in ensuring the historic French
reversals in Dien Bien Phu which were to lead to the Geneva Conference
* This traditional expression called Indochina was used to describe this region of people
around the Mekong River. This has often been described by various names as Suvanna
Phumi, Swarnabhoomi, Mekong basin, or sometimes merged into the larger reality of
Southeast Asia. From the early 1990, ADB has tried to evolve this category of Greater
Mekong Sub-region (GMS) as important multilateral regional framework for sustainable
development of these countries.
INDIA’S CONTACTS WITH GMS
19
of 1954. For sure, the international community recognized India’s role
and this was to herald another phase in India’s relations with Indochina.
India was not only invited to the Geneva negotiations but, given its
vigorous role, it was entrusted with (along with Canada and Poland) the
responsibility to oversee implementation of Geneva Agreement.18 As
indicator of their bilateral ties and to give boost to their inter-State
cooperation, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had visited Viet
Nam during 1954 and President Ho Chi Minh had reciprocated with a
visit to India in 1958.
From that perspective, India’s engagement with Indochina had
flourished much before its engagement with ASEAN or even before the
creation of ASEAN in 1967. To recall, India was one of the several
countries to extend economic and technical assistance to the Lower
Mekong Project under the aegis of the Mekong Committee (1957)
comprising of the four riparian counties, namely, Cambodia, Laos, South
Vietnam and Thailand.19 These pioneering experiments at developing
Mekong region were to be described as a model in multilateralism and
sub-regional cooperation and as “Marshall Plan for Mekong”.20 The
Mekong Basin Project, as also India’s ties with Indochina, were to soon
fall prey to Cold War dynamics. Especially for India, the Afro-Asian
Conference of Bandung (Indonesia) was to mark the peak of India’s
engagement with this region. Later, India’s war with China (1962)
followed by death of India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and
China’s atomic test (both in 1964) were to shrink India’s foreign policy
interests for the next three decades, if not more.21
2 - India’s ‘Look East’ Policy Redefined
It was only from the early 1990’s that India’s economic reforms
were to trigger its well-known ‘Look-East’ policy and this was to revive
India’s interest in Indo-China. This was also to lead to India
reformulating its worldview on various economic and political issues as
also about its strategic space that was now defined as Southern Asia,
including the GMS.22 Similarly, opening up and reforms of GMS and
induction of these countries into ASEAN during the later half of the
1990’s was to create necessary atmospherics for the India-GMS
MEKONG-GANGA COOPERATION INITIATIVE
20
rapprochement that had once so flourished during the 1950’s. The success
of India’s Look East policy with the original six of ASEAN, and the
appreciation amongst those original six of ASEAN that Indochina
required special attention for economic and social development, was to
greatly facilitate India’s engagement with GMS.23 Indeed, India was to
define its niche vis-à-vis GMS from the perspective of (a) being a partner
in Integration of ASEAN Initiative (IAI) of year 2000, and (b) on the basis
of India’s historical and cultural links with he GMS people. This was to
greatly facilitate India’s engagement with GMS and this second phase of
their rapprochement was to include several new fields like resource
management, technology and science, trade and commerce and also the
education and health sectors.24
India’s larger ‘Look East’ policy had been an attempt to diversify
India’s diplomacy as well as realize its new post-liberalization economic
engagement with its ‘extended neighborhood’ in Southeast Asia. So, in
its first phase during the early 1990’s, this had remained focused on six,
richer members of ASEAN and initiatives primarily in building
economic engagement. Induction of four GMS countries into ASEAN
was to transform focus for both ASEAN and India. Starting from the
mid-1990’s, this has witnessed India accelerating pace of its cooperation
in a tailor-made fashion with Singapore, Myanmar, Viet Nam, Cambodia
with over all China-India rapprochement providing the positive
atmospherics. Amongst the GMS countries, Thailand was the first to take
a major lead towards building a comprehensive economic and security
partnership with India.25 As a result, India-Thailand trade has not only
increased from USD1.1 billion to USD3.4 billion during 2001-2006 but
India’s total share in Thailand’s foreign trade has also increased from
0.85 per cent to 1.06 percent during this period.26
In January 2007, for instance, India’s Minister of State in the
Ministry of External Affairs, E. Ahmad, was to describe Mekong-Ganga
Cooperation Initiative (MGCI) as pillar of India’s Look East policy and
the one which especially facilitated a ‘strategic shift’ in India’s vision of
the world which he called, “from engaging in trade to engaging India’s
civilizational neighbors.”27 According to strategic analysts in India, the
GMS states also see India as a source of assurance especially in balancing
INDIA’S CONTACTS WITH GMS
21
their neighboring giant, China.28 In the 1990’s, therefore, duly
encouraged by some ASEAN countries, India’s overall military
cooperation has also heralded a new chapter of joint exercises and
cooperation with the naval/air forces of ASEAN, including Thailand
and Viet Nam from the GMS. This process was to begin much before the
MGCI and, in 1995, naval diplomatic initiative near the Andamans had
involved navies of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand and the exercises included symbolic search and
rescue operations at sea and exploring inter-operability.29
Indeed, regionalism and rise of China [as also India] have been the
two new trends in Asia which have been both appreciated and endorsed
by GMS deliberations that describe these trends presenting both
challenge and new opportunities for the GMS. Recognizing India as
emerging “economic powerhouse in Asia”, ASEAN has already signed,
in 2003, a framework agreement for ASEAN-India Regional Trade and
Investment Area which includes an FTA in goods, services and
investments. This is envisioned to become operat
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