- ข้อความ
- ประวัติศาสตร์
A second set of reforms has focused
A second set of reforms has focused on expanding non-partisan aspects of
the democratic process and institutional changes to facilitate this access.
Thus, increasing use of referendums, citizen hearings, and other forms of
direct action allow voters at least partially to bypass partisan politics.
Changes in policy administration are also likely to follow, as people demand
a direct voice in politics because they distrust parties as their agents.
In summary, this public scepticism about political parties is one piece of a
general syndrome involving the public’s growing doubts about representative democracy, and a search for other democratic forms. Parties are likely
to retain their central roles in structuring electoral choices and organising
the working of the parliamentary process, but their broader role in the
system of democratic politics is being challenged.
Notes
We would like to thank Anthony McGann, Ingrid van Biezen, and Martin Wattenberg for their
comments on a previous version of this paper. This is a revised version of an article that first
appeared in Rivista italiana di scienza politica 34 (December 2004), 381–404.
1. ‘Empty Vessels’, Economist, 24 July 1999, 51–2.
2. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data were acquired from the CSES website:
http://www.cses.org. The other data in this article came from the Inter-university
Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan.
3. Both items are measures on a five point agree/disagree scale; Table 1 presents the two agree
categories for each question, and thus should be comparable. These two questions are
strongly intercorrelated. For the 13 nations in Table 1, the average Pearson r correlation
between the two items is .26.
948 R. J. Dalton and S. A. Weldon4. These are not isolated findings. For instance, the 1997 Canadian election study asked a
battery of party image questions (Gidengil et al. 2001). They found that sizeable minorities
see the parties as untrustworthy and uncaring, with one Canadian in three believing that
parties hardly ever keep their election promises (32 per cent) and do not care what ordinary
people think (35 per cent). Similarly, Torcal et al. (2002) found that citizens in Southern
Europe believed parties were necessary for democracy to function, but they were
simultaneously sceptical about the performance of parties.
5. Another possibility is that voters are expressing doubts about parties other than their own.
In other words, most parties might be considered untrustworthy – except the party that the
respondent personally supports. Yet, attachment to one’s preferred political party has also
diminished over the past several decades in most of these nations (Dalton 2000). It is likely
that voters hold their own party as more trustworthy than the opposition – democracy
functions on this premise – but it is also apparent that attachment to one’s preferred party
have also weakened.
6. For instance, 90 per cent of the Swedes and Spanish respondents reported voting in the
previous election, as did 96 per cent of the Danes and 99 per cent of the Australians. We
excluded Australia from Table 4 because voting is compulsory and only 18 people reported
not voting in the election (and 11 of these were in the category of least trust in parties). In
addition, reported turnout often exceeds official statistics; for instance, 77 per cent of
Americans said they voted in the 1996 election, although official turnout rates are 49 per
cent of the voting age public.
In other analyses (not shown) we combined party images, age and education in a
multivariate model to predict turnout to ensure that the correlations in Table 4 are not
spuriously due to other basic predictors. The coefficients for party images remained
significant and little changed from the patterns presented in Table 4.
7. Distrust in parties seems to have a general demobilising effect upon voters that reaches
beyond electoral participation. For instance, in most nations those who distrust parties also
score lower in national indices of political knowledge included in the CSES survey.
However, many of the knowledge questions are based on political parties or elected
officials, and this might exaggerate the partisan effect.
8. The campaign activity items were not included in the CSES dataset. Instead, we accessed
the data from the separate national election studies that included the CSES supplement.
The number and type of campaign activities vary across nations in the CSES surveys. Thus,
the absolute levels of activity should not be compared across nations.
9. The literature is uncertain about which parties should be defined as anti-establishment
parties. We include all far-right nationalist, communist and extreme-left socialist parties. In
addition, we include Green parties as long as they are not more ideologically centrist than
the mainstream left party. Specifically, we defined the following as anti-establishment
parties: Australia, Greens (L); Canada, Reform (R); Denmark, Red-Green List (L) and
Danish People’s Party (R) ; Germany, PDS (L), Greens (L), Republikaner (R), and DVU
(R); Japan, Communist (L); Netherlands, Green Left (L); New Zealand, Alliance (L) and
NZ First (R); Norway, Red Electoral Alliance (L) and Progress Party (R); Spain,
Communist (L); Sweden, Extreme Left (L) and Greens (L); Switzerland, Swiss People’s
Party (R).
10. The data are from the 1996 election. In the following elections, a more viable anti-party
party has emerged in Pauline Hansen’s One Nation Party.
the democratic process and institutional changes to facilitate this access.
Thus, increasing use of referendums, citizen hearings, and other forms of
direct action allow voters at least partially to bypass partisan politics.
Changes in policy administration are also likely to follow, as people demand
a direct voice in politics because they distrust parties as their agents.
In summary, this public scepticism about political parties is one piece of a
general syndrome involving the public’s growing doubts about representative democracy, and a search for other democratic forms. Parties are likely
to retain their central roles in structuring electoral choices and organising
the working of the parliamentary process, but their broader role in the
system of democratic politics is being challenged.
Notes
We would like to thank Anthony McGann, Ingrid van Biezen, and Martin Wattenberg for their
comments on a previous version of this paper. This is a revised version of an article that first
appeared in Rivista italiana di scienza politica 34 (December 2004), 381–404.
1. ‘Empty Vessels’, Economist, 24 July 1999, 51–2.
2. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data were acquired from the CSES website:
http://www.cses.org. The other data in this article came from the Inter-university
Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan.
3. Both items are measures on a five point agree/disagree scale; Table 1 presents the two agree
categories for each question, and thus should be comparable. These two questions are
strongly intercorrelated. For the 13 nations in Table 1, the average Pearson r correlation
between the two items is .26.
948 R. J. Dalton and S. A. Weldon4. These are not isolated findings. For instance, the 1997 Canadian election study asked a
battery of party image questions (Gidengil et al. 2001). They found that sizeable minorities
see the parties as untrustworthy and uncaring, with one Canadian in three believing that
parties hardly ever keep their election promises (32 per cent) and do not care what ordinary
people think (35 per cent). Similarly, Torcal et al. (2002) found that citizens in Southern
Europe believed parties were necessary for democracy to function, but they were
simultaneously sceptical about the performance of parties.
5. Another possibility is that voters are expressing doubts about parties other than their own.
In other words, most parties might be considered untrustworthy – except the party that the
respondent personally supports. Yet, attachment to one’s preferred political party has also
diminished over the past several decades in most of these nations (Dalton 2000). It is likely
that voters hold their own party as more trustworthy than the opposition – democracy
functions on this premise – but it is also apparent that attachment to one’s preferred party
have also weakened.
6. For instance, 90 per cent of the Swedes and Spanish respondents reported voting in the
previous election, as did 96 per cent of the Danes and 99 per cent of the Australians. We
excluded Australia from Table 4 because voting is compulsory and only 18 people reported
not voting in the election (and 11 of these were in the category of least trust in parties). In
addition, reported turnout often exceeds official statistics; for instance, 77 per cent of
Americans said they voted in the 1996 election, although official turnout rates are 49 per
cent of the voting age public.
In other analyses (not shown) we combined party images, age and education in a
multivariate model to predict turnout to ensure that the correlations in Table 4 are not
spuriously due to other basic predictors. The coefficients for party images remained
significant and little changed from the patterns presented in Table 4.
7. Distrust in parties seems to have a general demobilising effect upon voters that reaches
beyond electoral participation. For instance, in most nations those who distrust parties also
score lower in national indices of political knowledge included in the CSES survey.
However, many of the knowledge questions are based on political parties or elected
officials, and this might exaggerate the partisan effect.
8. The campaign activity items were not included in the CSES dataset. Instead, we accessed
the data from the separate national election studies that included the CSES supplement.
The number and type of campaign activities vary across nations in the CSES surveys. Thus,
the absolute levels of activity should not be compared across nations.
9. The literature is uncertain about which parties should be defined as anti-establishment
parties. We include all far-right nationalist, communist and extreme-left socialist parties. In
addition, we include Green parties as long as they are not more ideologically centrist than
the mainstream left party. Specifically, we defined the following as anti-establishment
parties: Australia, Greens (L); Canada, Reform (R); Denmark, Red-Green List (L) and
Danish People’s Party (R) ; Germany, PDS (L), Greens (L), Republikaner (R), and DVU
(R); Japan, Communist (L); Netherlands, Green Left (L); New Zealand, Alliance (L) and
NZ First (R); Norway, Red Electoral Alliance (L) and Progress Party (R); Spain,
Communist (L); Sweden, Extreme Left (L) and Greens (L); Switzerland, Swiss People’s
Party (R).
10. The data are from the 1996 election. In the following elections, a more viable anti-party
party has emerged in Pauline Hansen’s One Nation Party.
0/5000
A second set of reforms has focused on expanding non-partisan aspects ofthe democratic process and institutional changes to facilitate this access.Thus, increasing use of referendums, citizen hearings, and other forms ofdirect action allow voters at least partially to bypass partisan politics.Changes in policy administration are also likely to follow, as people demanda direct voice in politics because they distrust parties as their agents.In summary, this public scepticism about political parties is one piece of ageneral syndrome involving the public’s growing doubts about representative democracy, and a search for other democratic forms. Parties are likelyto retain their central roles in structuring electoral choices and organisingthe working of the parliamentary process, but their broader role in thesystem of democratic politics is being challenged.NotesWe would like to thank Anthony McGann, Ingrid van Biezen, and Martin Wattenberg for theircomments on a previous version of this paper. This is a revised version of an article that firstappeared in Rivista italiana di scienza politica 34 (December 2004), 381–404.1. ‘Empty Vessels’, Economist, 24 July 1999, 51–2.2. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data were acquired from the CSES website:http://www.cses.org. The other data in this article came from the Inter-universityConsortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan.3. Both items are measures on a five point agree/disagree scale; Table 1 presents the two agreecategories for each question, and thus should be comparable. These two questions arestrongly intercorrelated. For the 13 nations in Table 1, the average Pearson r correlationbetween the two items is .26.948 R. J. Dalton and S. A. Weldon4. These are not isolated findings. For instance, the 1997 Canadian election study asked abattery of party image questions (Gidengil et al. 2001). They found that sizeable minoritiessee the parties as untrustworthy and uncaring, with one Canadian in three believing thatparties hardly ever keep their election promises (32 per cent) and do not care what ordinarypeople think (35 per cent). Similarly, Torcal et al. (2002) found that citizens in SouthernEurope believed parties were necessary for democracy to function, but they weresimultaneously sceptical about the performance of parties.5. Another possibility is that voters are expressing doubts about parties other than their own.In other words, most parties might be considered untrustworthy – except the party that therespondent personally supports. Yet, attachment to one’s preferred political party has alsodiminished over the past several decades in most of these nations (Dalton 2000). It is likelythat voters hold their own party as more trustworthy than the opposition – democracyfunctions on this premise – but it is also apparent that attachment to one’s preferred partyhave also weakened.
6. For instance, 90 per cent of the Swedes and Spanish respondents reported voting in the
previous election, as did 96 per cent of the Danes and 99 per cent of the Australians. We
excluded Australia from Table 4 because voting is compulsory and only 18 people reported
not voting in the election (and 11 of these were in the category of least trust in parties). In
addition, reported turnout often exceeds official statistics; for instance, 77 per cent of
Americans said they voted in the 1996 election, although official turnout rates are 49 per
cent of the voting age public.
In other analyses (not shown) we combined party images, age and education in a
multivariate model to predict turnout to ensure that the correlations in Table 4 are not
spuriously due to other basic predictors. The coefficients for party images remained
significant and little changed from the patterns presented in Table 4.
7. Distrust in parties seems to have a general demobilising effect upon voters that reaches
beyond electoral participation. For instance, in most nations those who distrust parties also
score lower in national indices of political knowledge included in the CSES survey.
However, many of the knowledge questions are based on political parties or elected
officials, and this might exaggerate the partisan effect.
8. The campaign activity items were not included in the CSES dataset. Instead, we accessed
the data from the separate national election studies that included the CSES supplement.
The number and type of campaign activities vary across nations in the CSES surveys. Thus,
the absolute levels of activity should not be compared across nations.
9. The literature is uncertain about which parties should be defined as anti-establishment
parties. We include all far-right nationalist, communist and extreme-left socialist parties. In
addition, we include Green parties as long as they are not more ideologically centrist than
the mainstream left party. Specifically, we defined the following as anti-establishment
parties: Australia, Greens (L); Canada, Reform (R); Denmark, Red-Green List (L) and
Danish People’s Party (R) ; Germany, PDS (L), Greens (L), Republikaner (R), and DVU
(R); Japan, Communist (L); Netherlands, Green Left (L); New Zealand, Alliance (L) and
NZ First (R); Norway, Red Electoral Alliance (L) and Progress Party (R); Spain,
Communist (L); Sweden, Extreme Left (L) and Greens (L); Switzerland, Swiss People’s
Party (R).
10. The data are from the 1996 election. In the following elections, a more viable anti-party
party has emerged in Pauline Hansen’s One Nation Party.
6. For instance, 90 per cent of the Swedes and Spanish respondents reported voting in the
previous election, as did 96 per cent of the Danes and 99 per cent of the Australians. We
excluded Australia from Table 4 because voting is compulsory and only 18 people reported
not voting in the election (and 11 of these were in the category of least trust in parties). In
addition, reported turnout often exceeds official statistics; for instance, 77 per cent of
Americans said they voted in the 1996 election, although official turnout rates are 49 per
cent of the voting age public.
In other analyses (not shown) we combined party images, age and education in a
multivariate model to predict turnout to ensure that the correlations in Table 4 are not
spuriously due to other basic predictors. The coefficients for party images remained
significant and little changed from the patterns presented in Table 4.
7. Distrust in parties seems to have a general demobilising effect upon voters that reaches
beyond electoral participation. For instance, in most nations those who distrust parties also
score lower in national indices of political knowledge included in the CSES survey.
However, many of the knowledge questions are based on political parties or elected
officials, and this might exaggerate the partisan effect.
8. The campaign activity items were not included in the CSES dataset. Instead, we accessed
the data from the separate national election studies that included the CSES supplement.
The number and type of campaign activities vary across nations in the CSES surveys. Thus,
the absolute levels of activity should not be compared across nations.
9. The literature is uncertain about which parties should be defined as anti-establishment
parties. We include all far-right nationalist, communist and extreme-left socialist parties. In
addition, we include Green parties as long as they are not more ideologically centrist than
the mainstream left party. Specifically, we defined the following as anti-establishment
parties: Australia, Greens (L); Canada, Reform (R); Denmark, Red-Green List (L) and
Danish People’s Party (R) ; Germany, PDS (L), Greens (L), Republikaner (R), and DVU
(R); Japan, Communist (L); Netherlands, Green Left (L); New Zealand, Alliance (L) and
NZ First (R); Norway, Red Electoral Alliance (L) and Progress Party (R); Spain,
Communist (L); Sweden, Extreme Left (L) and Greens (L); Switzerland, Swiss People’s
Party (R).
10. The data are from the 1996 election. In the following elections, a more viable anti-party
party has emerged in Pauline Hansen’s One Nation Party.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
A second set of reforms has focused on expanding non-partisan aspects of
the democratic process and institutional changes to facilitate this access.
Thus, increasing use of referendums, citizen hearings, and other forms of
direct action allow voters at least partially to bypass partisan politics.
Changes in policy administration are also likely to follow, as people demand
a direct voice in politics because they distrust parties as their agents.
In summary, this public scepticism about political parties is one piece of a
general syndrome involving the public’s growing doubts about representative democracy, and a search for other democratic forms. Parties are likely
to retain their central roles in structuring electoral choices and organising
the working of the parliamentary process, but their broader role in the
system of democratic politics is being challenged.
Notes
We would like to thank Anthony McGann, Ingrid van Biezen, and Martin Wattenberg for their
comments on a previous version of this paper. This is a revised version of an article that first
appeared in Rivista italiana di scienza politica 34 (December 2004), 381–404.
1. ‘Empty Vessels’, Economist, 24 July 1999, 51–2.
2. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data were acquired from the CSES website:
http://www.cses.org. The other data in this article came from the Inter-university
Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan.
3. Both items are measures on a five point agree/disagree scale; Table 1 presents the two agree
categories for each question, and thus should be comparable. These two questions are
strongly intercorrelated. For the 13 nations in Table 1, the average Pearson r correlation
between the two items is .26.
948 R. J. Dalton and S. A. Weldon4. These are not isolated findings. For instance, the 1997 Canadian election study asked a
battery of party image questions (Gidengil et al. 2001). They found that sizeable minorities
see the parties as untrustworthy and uncaring, with one Canadian in three believing that
parties hardly ever keep their election promises (32 per cent) and do not care what ordinary
people think (35 per cent). Similarly, Torcal et al. (2002) found that citizens in Southern
Europe believed parties were necessary for democracy to function, but they were
simultaneously sceptical about the performance of parties.
5. Another possibility is that voters are expressing doubts about parties other than their own.
In other words, most parties might be considered untrustworthy – except the party that the
respondent personally supports. Yet, attachment to one’s preferred political party has also
diminished over the past several decades in most of these nations (Dalton 2000). It is likely
that voters hold their own party as more trustworthy than the opposition – democracy
functions on this premise – but it is also apparent that attachment to one’s preferred party
have also weakened.
6. For instance, 90 per cent of the Swedes and Spanish respondents reported voting in the
previous election, as did 96 per cent of the Danes and 99 per cent of the Australians. We
excluded Australia from Table 4 because voting is compulsory and only 18 people reported
not voting in the election (and 11 of these were in the category of least trust in parties). In
addition, reported turnout often exceeds official statistics; for instance, 77 per cent of
Americans said they voted in the 1996 election, although official turnout rates are 49 per
cent of the voting age public.
In other analyses (not shown) we combined party images, age and education in a
multivariate model to predict turnout to ensure that the correlations in Table 4 are not
spuriously due to other basic predictors. The coefficients for party images remained
significant and little changed from the patterns presented in Table 4.
7. Distrust in parties seems to have a general demobilising effect upon voters that reaches
beyond electoral participation. For instance, in most nations those who distrust parties also
score lower in national indices of political knowledge included in the CSES survey.
However, many of the knowledge questions are based on political parties or elected
officials, and this might exaggerate the partisan effect.
8. The campaign activity items were not included in the CSES dataset. Instead, we accessed
the data from the separate national election studies that included the CSES supplement.
The number and type of campaign activities vary across nations in the CSES surveys. Thus,
the absolute levels of activity should not be compared across nations.
9. The literature is uncertain about which parties should be defined as anti-establishment
parties. We include all far-right nationalist, communist and extreme-left socialist parties. In
addition, we include Green parties as long as they are not more ideologically centrist than
the mainstream left party. Specifically, we defined the following as anti-establishment
parties: Australia, Greens (L); Canada, Reform (R); Denmark, Red-Green List (L) and
Danish People’s Party (R) ; Germany, PDS (L), Greens (L), Republikaner (R), and DVU
(R); Japan, Communist (L); Netherlands, Green Left (L); New Zealand, Alliance (L) and
NZ First (R); Norway, Red Electoral Alliance (L) and Progress Party (R); Spain,
Communist (L); Sweden, Extreme Left (L) and Greens (L); Switzerland, Swiss People’s
Party (R).
10. The data are from the 1996 election. In the following elections, a more viable anti-party
party has emerged in Pauline Hansen’s One Nation Party.
the democratic process and institutional changes to facilitate this access.
Thus, increasing use of referendums, citizen hearings, and other forms of
direct action allow voters at least partially to bypass partisan politics.
Changes in policy administration are also likely to follow, as people demand
a direct voice in politics because they distrust parties as their agents.
In summary, this public scepticism about political parties is one piece of a
general syndrome involving the public’s growing doubts about representative democracy, and a search for other democratic forms. Parties are likely
to retain their central roles in structuring electoral choices and organising
the working of the parliamentary process, but their broader role in the
system of democratic politics is being challenged.
Notes
We would like to thank Anthony McGann, Ingrid van Biezen, and Martin Wattenberg for their
comments on a previous version of this paper. This is a revised version of an article that first
appeared in Rivista italiana di scienza politica 34 (December 2004), 381–404.
1. ‘Empty Vessels’, Economist, 24 July 1999, 51–2.
2. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data were acquired from the CSES website:
http://www.cses.org. The other data in this article came from the Inter-university
Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan.
3. Both items are measures on a five point agree/disagree scale; Table 1 presents the two agree
categories for each question, and thus should be comparable. These two questions are
strongly intercorrelated. For the 13 nations in Table 1, the average Pearson r correlation
between the two items is .26.
948 R. J. Dalton and S. A. Weldon4. These are not isolated findings. For instance, the 1997 Canadian election study asked a
battery of party image questions (Gidengil et al. 2001). They found that sizeable minorities
see the parties as untrustworthy and uncaring, with one Canadian in three believing that
parties hardly ever keep their election promises (32 per cent) and do not care what ordinary
people think (35 per cent). Similarly, Torcal et al. (2002) found that citizens in Southern
Europe believed parties were necessary for democracy to function, but they were
simultaneously sceptical about the performance of parties.
5. Another possibility is that voters are expressing doubts about parties other than their own.
In other words, most parties might be considered untrustworthy – except the party that the
respondent personally supports. Yet, attachment to one’s preferred political party has also
diminished over the past several decades in most of these nations (Dalton 2000). It is likely
that voters hold their own party as more trustworthy than the opposition – democracy
functions on this premise – but it is also apparent that attachment to one’s preferred party
have also weakened.
6. For instance, 90 per cent of the Swedes and Spanish respondents reported voting in the
previous election, as did 96 per cent of the Danes and 99 per cent of the Australians. We
excluded Australia from Table 4 because voting is compulsory and only 18 people reported
not voting in the election (and 11 of these were in the category of least trust in parties). In
addition, reported turnout often exceeds official statistics; for instance, 77 per cent of
Americans said they voted in the 1996 election, although official turnout rates are 49 per
cent of the voting age public.
In other analyses (not shown) we combined party images, age and education in a
multivariate model to predict turnout to ensure that the correlations in Table 4 are not
spuriously due to other basic predictors. The coefficients for party images remained
significant and little changed from the patterns presented in Table 4.
7. Distrust in parties seems to have a general demobilising effect upon voters that reaches
beyond electoral participation. For instance, in most nations those who distrust parties also
score lower in national indices of political knowledge included in the CSES survey.
However, many of the knowledge questions are based on political parties or elected
officials, and this might exaggerate the partisan effect.
8. The campaign activity items were not included in the CSES dataset. Instead, we accessed
the data from the separate national election studies that included the CSES supplement.
The number and type of campaign activities vary across nations in the CSES surveys. Thus,
the absolute levels of activity should not be compared across nations.
9. The literature is uncertain about which parties should be defined as anti-establishment
parties. We include all far-right nationalist, communist and extreme-left socialist parties. In
addition, we include Green parties as long as they are not more ideologically centrist than
the mainstream left party. Specifically, we defined the following as anti-establishment
parties: Australia, Greens (L); Canada, Reform (R); Denmark, Red-Green List (L) and
Danish People’s Party (R) ; Germany, PDS (L), Greens (L), Republikaner (R), and DVU
(R); Japan, Communist (L); Netherlands, Green Left (L); New Zealand, Alliance (L) and
NZ First (R); Norway, Red Electoral Alliance (L) and Progress Party (R); Spain,
Communist (L); Sweden, Extreme Left (L) and Greens (L); Switzerland, Swiss People’s
Party (R).
10. The data are from the 1996 election. In the following elections, a more viable anti-party
party has emerged in Pauline Hansen’s One Nation Party.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
สวีเดน ซ้ายสุด ( L ) และสีเขียว ( L ) ; สวิตเซอร์แลนด์ พรรคประชาชนสวิส ( R )
.
10 ข้อมูลจาก 2539 การเลือกตั้ง ในการเลือกตั้ง ต่อไปนี้ได้ต่อต้านพรรคพรรค
ได้เกิดขึ้นในประเทศของพอลลีน แฮนสัน พรรคชุดที่สองของการปฏิรูป ได้เน้นการขยายที่ไม่ใช่พวกพ้องด้าน
เปลี่ยนแปลงกระบวนการประชาธิปไตยและสถาบัน เพื่อความสะดวกในการเข้าถึงนี้ .
จึงเพิ่มการใช้ประชามติ ประชาชนรับฟัง และรูปแบบอื่น ๆของการกระทำโดยตรงอนุญาตให้ผู้มีสิทธิเลือกตั้ง
อย่างน้อยบางส่วนเพื่อหลีกเลี่ยงการเมืองพรรค .
เปลี่ยนแปลงการบริหารนโยบายยังมีแนวโน้มที่จะปฏิบัติตาม เป็นคนความต้องการ
เสียงโดยตรงในทางการเมืองเพราะพวกเขาไม่ไว้ใจฝ่ายเป็นตัวแทนของพวกเขา .
สรุปนี้สาธารณะความสงสัยเกี่ยวกับพรรคการเมืองเป็นชิ้นส่วนหนึ่งของกลุ่มอาการที่เกี่ยวข้องกับ
ทั่วไปของประชาชน การสงสัยเกี่ยวกับระบอบประชาธิปไตยตัวแทน และการค้นหารูปแบบประชาธิปไตยอื่น ๆ บุคคลที่มีแนวโน้มที่จะรักษาบทบาทของพวกเขาในกลาง
เลือกตัวเลือกและการจัดงานการทำงานของกระบวนการของรัฐสภา แต่ตนถูกบทบาทในระบบการเมืองแบบประชาธิปไตยมี
โดนท้าทาย หมายเหตุขอขอบคุณแอนโทนี่ mcgann อินกริดฟาน biezen และมาร์ตินวัตเทินเบิร์กสำหรับความคิดเห็นของพวกเขา
ในรุ่นก่อนหน้าของบทความนี้ นี้เป็นรุ่นที่แก้ไขของบทความที่ปรากฏใน rivista
จึงตัดสินใจเดินทางจาก ดิ scienza การวิเคราะห์ทางการเมือง 34 ( ธันวาคม 2547 ) , 381 - 404 .
1' ' เปล่าเรือ , นักเศรษฐศาสตร์ , 24 กรกฎาคม 1999 , 51 ) 2
2 การศึกษาเปรียบเทียบข้อมูลที่ได้มาจากระบบการเลือกตั้ง cses เว็บไซต์ :
http://www.cses.org . ข้อมูลอื่น ๆในบทความนี้มาจากอินเตอร์ มหาวิทยาลัย
สมาคมเพื่อการวิจัยทางรัฐศาสตร์ที่มหาวิทยาลัยมิชิแกน .
3 ทั้งสองรายการมีมาตรการในจุดที่เห็นด้วย / ไม่เห็นด้วยจึงได้ขนาด ; ตารางที่ 1 แสดงสองยอมรับ
หมวดหมู่สำหรับแต่ละคำถาม และดังนั้น ควรจะใกล้เคียงกัน ทั้งสองคำถามจะขอ intercorrelated
. ใน 13 ประเทศตารางที่ 1 ค่า r (
ระหว่างสองรายการคือ . 26 .
882 อาร์เจดาลตันและ S . A . weldon4 . เหล่านี้จะไม่แยกจึง ndings . ตัวอย่างเช่นแคนาดา 1997 เลือกตั้งศึกษาถาม
แบตเตอรี่ของพรรคคำถามรูปภาพ ( gidengil et al . 2001 )พร้อมกันสงสัยเกี่ยวกับประสิทธิภาพของบุคคล .
5 ความเป็นไปได้อีกประการหนึ่ง คือ ผู้มีสิทธิเลือกตั้งที่แสดงความสงสัยเกี่ยวกับบุคคลอื่นที่ไม่ใช่ของตนเอง .
ในคำอื่น ๆที่บุคคลส่วนใหญ่อาจจะพิจารณาและไว้ใจไม่ได้ ยกเว้นพรรค
ผู้ตอบเองรองรับ ยังยึดติดกับคน ๆ หนึ่งที่ต้องการพรรคการเมืองยัง
ลดลงในช่วงหลายทศวรรษที่ผ่านมาในส่วนใหญ่ของประเทศเหล่านี้ ( ดาลตัน 2000 ) มันมีโอกาส
ผู้มีสิทธิเลือกตั้งที่ถือของพรรคตัวเอง เชื่อถือได้มากกว่าฝ่ายค้าน–ประชาธิปไตย
ฟังก์ชันบนนี้หลักฐาน–แต่ก็ยังชัดเจนว่าผูกพันกับคนชอบปาร์ตี้
ยังลดลง .
6 ตัวอย่าง ร้อยละ 90 ของสวีเดนและผู้ตอบแบบสอบถามรายงานการลงคะแนนเสียงใน
สเปน
.
10 ข้อมูลจาก 2539 การเลือกตั้ง ในการเลือกตั้ง ต่อไปนี้ได้ต่อต้านพรรคพรรค
ได้เกิดขึ้นในประเทศของพอลลีน แฮนสัน พรรคชุดที่สองของการปฏิรูป ได้เน้นการขยายที่ไม่ใช่พวกพ้องด้าน
เปลี่ยนแปลงกระบวนการประชาธิปไตยและสถาบัน เพื่อความสะดวกในการเข้าถึงนี้ .
จึงเพิ่มการใช้ประชามติ ประชาชนรับฟัง และรูปแบบอื่น ๆของการกระทำโดยตรงอนุญาตให้ผู้มีสิทธิเลือกตั้ง
อย่างน้อยบางส่วนเพื่อหลีกเลี่ยงการเมืองพรรค .
เปลี่ยนแปลงการบริหารนโยบายยังมีแนวโน้มที่จะปฏิบัติตาม เป็นคนความต้องการ
เสียงโดยตรงในทางการเมืองเพราะพวกเขาไม่ไว้ใจฝ่ายเป็นตัวแทนของพวกเขา .
สรุปนี้สาธารณะความสงสัยเกี่ยวกับพรรคการเมืองเป็นชิ้นส่วนหนึ่งของกลุ่มอาการที่เกี่ยวข้องกับ
ทั่วไปของประชาชน การสงสัยเกี่ยวกับระบอบประชาธิปไตยตัวแทน และการค้นหารูปแบบประชาธิปไตยอื่น ๆ บุคคลที่มีแนวโน้มที่จะรักษาบทบาทของพวกเขาในกลาง
เลือกตัวเลือกและการจัดงานการทำงานของกระบวนการของรัฐสภา แต่ตนถูกบทบาทในระบบการเมืองแบบประชาธิปไตยมี
โดนท้าทาย หมายเหตุขอขอบคุณแอนโทนี่ mcgann อินกริดฟาน biezen และมาร์ตินวัตเทินเบิร์กสำหรับความคิดเห็นของพวกเขา
ในรุ่นก่อนหน้าของบทความนี้ นี้เป็นรุ่นที่แก้ไขของบทความที่ปรากฏใน rivista
จึงตัดสินใจเดินทางจาก ดิ scienza การวิเคราะห์ทางการเมือง 34 ( ธันวาคม 2547 ) , 381 - 404 .
1' ' เปล่าเรือ , นักเศรษฐศาสตร์ , 24 กรกฎาคม 1999 , 51 ) 2
2 การศึกษาเปรียบเทียบข้อมูลที่ได้มาจากระบบการเลือกตั้ง cses เว็บไซต์ :
http://www.cses.org . ข้อมูลอื่น ๆในบทความนี้มาจากอินเตอร์ มหาวิทยาลัย
สมาคมเพื่อการวิจัยทางรัฐศาสตร์ที่มหาวิทยาลัยมิชิแกน .
3 ทั้งสองรายการมีมาตรการในจุดที่เห็นด้วย / ไม่เห็นด้วยจึงได้ขนาด ; ตารางที่ 1 แสดงสองยอมรับ
หมวดหมู่สำหรับแต่ละคำถาม และดังนั้น ควรจะใกล้เคียงกัน ทั้งสองคำถามจะขอ intercorrelated
. ใน 13 ประเทศตารางที่ 1 ค่า r (
ระหว่างสองรายการคือ . 26 .
882 อาร์เจดาลตันและ S . A . weldon4 . เหล่านี้จะไม่แยกจึง ndings . ตัวอย่างเช่นแคนาดา 1997 เลือกตั้งศึกษาถาม
แบตเตอรี่ของพรรคคำถามรูปภาพ ( gidengil et al . 2001 )พร้อมกันสงสัยเกี่ยวกับประสิทธิภาพของบุคคล .
5 ความเป็นไปได้อีกประการหนึ่ง คือ ผู้มีสิทธิเลือกตั้งที่แสดงความสงสัยเกี่ยวกับบุคคลอื่นที่ไม่ใช่ของตนเอง .
ในคำอื่น ๆที่บุคคลส่วนใหญ่อาจจะพิจารณาและไว้ใจไม่ได้ ยกเว้นพรรค
ผู้ตอบเองรองรับ ยังยึดติดกับคน ๆ หนึ่งที่ต้องการพรรคการเมืองยัง
ลดลงในช่วงหลายทศวรรษที่ผ่านมาในส่วนใหญ่ของประเทศเหล่านี้ ( ดาลตัน 2000 ) มันมีโอกาส
ผู้มีสิทธิเลือกตั้งที่ถือของพรรคตัวเอง เชื่อถือได้มากกว่าฝ่ายค้าน–ประชาธิปไตย
ฟังก์ชันบนนี้หลักฐาน–แต่ก็ยังชัดเจนว่าผูกพันกับคนชอบปาร์ตี้
ยังลดลง .
6 ตัวอย่าง ร้อยละ 90 ของสวีเดนและผู้ตอบแบบสอบถามรายงานการลงคะแนนเสียงใน
สเปน
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