b) Intent
i) When a person has knowledge to a substantial certainty that harmful or offensive contact will result from a certain action, a battery occurs if that action is taken, even if there is no intent to cause harm to another. “If the actor knows that the consequences are substantially certain to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.” (Contrast to negligence!)
(1) Vosburg v. Putney: Schoolboy kicks friend in shin in classroom. Due to prior injury, P left w/ even more serious injury. D found liable. The wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him. ii) Brzoska v. Olson: Ps, a group of former patients of D, sued estate of D under theories of negligence, battery and misrepresentation after they found out that their dentist died from AIDS. Since patients had undergone teeth extractions when their gums bled, etc. the doctor’s touching was deemed “offensive” and “unconsented”, which later caused them a fear of having contracted HIV. Question: Did the performance of dental procedures by an HIV-infected dentist, standing alone, constitute offensive bodily contact for purposes of battery, i.e. did such touching offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity? HOLDING: No. P suffered no injuries as a result of D’s touching. P alleged no injuries stemming from their exposure to HIV, but instead, allege “injuries” arising solely out of their fear that they were exposed to IV. As a matter of law, the incidental touching of a patient by an HIV-infected dentist while performing ordinary, consented to dental procedures is insufficient to sustain a battery claim in the absence of a channel for HIV infection. Such contact is offensive ONLY if it results in actual exposure to the HIV virus.
iii) Werth v. Taylor: P sued doctor on theory of battery for authorizing a blood transfusion to save her life despite her previous refusal on account of her religion (she was a Jehovah Witness). P argued that the potentially life-threatening situation did not alter P’s conscious, deliberate, and unequivocal refusal and therefore D’s decision to perform the transfusion with knowledge of refusal resulted in a battery. HOLDING: No battery. P’s prior refusals had not been made when her life was hanging in the balance or when it appeared that death might be a possibility if a transfusion were not given. Clearly, her refusals were, therefore, not contemporaneous or informed. IF UNCONSCIOUS, CONSENT IS IMPLIED