I argue that the compulsion and resultant participation of the reluctant in the killing constituted a dramatic behavior shift, with related consequences for the scale and inten- sity of anti-Tutsi violence. As such, the unprecedented magnitude of violence in 1994 can, to a large extent, be attributed to the emergence of a violence-promoting norm among Rwandan Hutu, a norm that compelled all Hutu – reluctant or otherwise – to participate in the violence. Simply put, Hutu who opposed the genocide and were reluctant to participate in the killing, killedin the hundreds and thousands because they were left with no other choice: ‘kill or be killed’.3 If, as I argue, a violence-promoting norm did emerge in Rwanda and engender mass participation, this raises a number of related questions: Why, for instance, do norms that engender mass participation in violence emerge within some ethnic groups and not others? Can these behavioral norms vary in strength within a given episode of violence? Can these norms also promote nonviolent outcomes such as intergroup cooperation? Is norm formation equally likely in ethnic groups with similar aggregate characteristics? It is equally likely with weak or no punishments?
In this article, I analyze the emergence of ethnic norms – rules instituted and enforced within an ethnic group to shape the behavior of its members toward rivals.4 By delineating behavioral expectations in times of conflict and cooperation, norms constitute one mechanism to shape group behavior by increasing cohesiveness among co-ethnics and enlarging the set of participants in group action. Therefore, I do not claim that ethnic norms are the only mechanism that matters in episodes of mass violence. Rather, I seek to determine the conditions under which expectations of mass participation will emerge by analyzing the dynamics of within- group interaction. Using the Rwandan genocide as a foil, my framework under- scores (1) the initial proclivity of groupmembers to engage in interethnic violence and punish co-ethnics who fail to engage in violence; (2) the structure of social networks within the group; and (3) the strength of punishments imposed on individuals whose behavior deviates from emergent group behavior.
I argue that the compulsion and resultant participation of the reluctant in the killing constituted a dramatic behavior shift, with related consequences for the scale and inten- sity of anti-Tutsi violence. As such, the unprecedented magnitude of violence in 1994 can, to a large extent, be attributed to the emergence of a violence-promoting norm among Rwandan Hutu, a norm that compelled all Hutu – reluctant or otherwise – to participate in the violence. Simply put, Hutu who opposed the genocide and were reluctant to participate in the killing, killedin the hundreds and thousands because they were left with no other choice: ‘kill or be killed’.3 If, as I argue, a violence-promoting norm did emerge in Rwanda and engender mass participation, this raises a number of related questions: Why, for instance, do norms that engender mass participation in violence emerge within some ethnic groups and not others? Can these behavioral norms vary in strength within a given episode of violence? Can these norms also promote nonviolent outcomes such as intergroup cooperation? Is norm formation equally likely in ethnic groups with similar aggregate characteristics? It is equally likely with weak or no punishments?In this article, I analyze the emergence of ethnic norms – rules instituted and enforced within an ethnic group to shape the behavior of its members toward rivals.4 By delineating behavioral expectations in times of conflict and cooperation, norms constitute one mechanism to shape group behavior by increasing cohesiveness among co-ethnics and enlarging the set of participants in group action. Therefore, I do not claim that ethnic norms are the only mechanism that matters in episodes of mass violence. Rather, I seek to determine the conditions under which expectations of mass participation will emerge by analyzing the dynamics of within- group interaction. Using the Rwandan genocide as a foil, my framework under- scores (1) the initial proclivity of groupmembers to engage in interethnic violence and punish co-ethnics who fail to engage in violence; (2) the structure of social networks within the group; and (3) the strength of punishments imposed on individuals whose behavior deviates from emergent group behavior.
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