In times of crisis, when decisionmakers are confronted by a surprising, threatening event and have only a short time to make a decision about how to respond, then using the rational model as a way to assess the other side's behavior is an appropriate choice. If a state knows very little about the internal domestic processes of another state—as the United States did vis—a-vis mainland China during the era of Mao Zedong—then decisionmakers have little alternative but to assume that the other state will follow the rationalmodel. Indeed, most U.S. assessments of decisions it taken by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in the absence of better information, were based on a rational model: ‘the Soviet Union had a goal, its alternatives were clearly laid out, and decisions were taken to maximize its achievement of its goal. Only since the opening of the Soviet governmental archives following the end of the Cold War have historians found that, in fact, the Soviets had no concrete plans for turning Poland, Hungary, Romania, or other East European states into communist dictatorships or socialist economies, as the United States believed. The Soviets appear to have been guided by events happening in the region, not by a specific rational plan or ideology. The United States was incorrect in imputing the rational model to Soviet decisionmaking, but in the absence of complete information, this was the least risky approach: the anarchy of the international system means that a state assumes one’s opponent engages in rational decisionmaking.