Even though Morck et al. (1988) point out that theory cannot unambiguously identify
at what managerial ownership levels their incentives will change, they do suggest that
entrenchment probably begins to occur at a managerial-ownership level where management
feels protected from market discipline. It is interesting, therefore, that Morck et al.
(1988) and Short and Keasey (1999) find that management appears to feel entrenched
even though they own less than 50% of the firm, i.e., where ‘outside’ shareholders have
majority control. However, and as pointed out by Kole (1995), it is probably easier for
inside-owners of a large established firm to feel, and to be, entrenched. Larger firms
have more diffuse ownership so it is more difficult for outsider shareholders to exert
control, and just as important, established firms have less value-maximizing control
potential than do younger firms (i.e., an IPO firm has significant variability with regard
to its future potential as compared to an established firm, so new outside shareholders of
IPO firms are likely to be very motivated to exert influence and control). Thus, for an
IPO firm, it may require more ownership stakes for an inside-owner to be entrenched
from outsider scrutiny and discipline.7 Note also that IPO firms are riskier than
established firms. Therefore, to the inside-owner, the payoffs to shirking is less variable
than the payoffs to value-maximizing pursuits, which, in turn, means that riskier firms
Even though Morck et al. (1988) point out that theory cannot unambiguously identifyat what managerial ownership levels their incentives will change, they do suggest thatentrenchment probably begins to occur at a managerial-ownership level where managementfeels protected from market discipline. It is interesting, therefore, that Morck et al.(1988) and Short and Keasey (1999) find that management appears to feel entrenchedeven though they own less than 50% of the firm, i.e., where ‘outside’ shareholders havemajority control. However, and as pointed out by Kole (1995), it is probably easier forinside-owners of a large established firm to feel, and to be, entrenched. Larger firmshave more diffuse ownership so it is more difficult for outsider shareholders to exertcontrol, and just as important, established firms have less value-maximizing controlpotential than do younger firms (i.e., an IPO firm has significant variability with regardto its future potential as compared to an established firm, so new outside shareholders ofIPO firms are likely to be very motivated to exert influence and control). Thus, for anIPO firm, it may require more ownership stakes for an inside-owner to be entrenchedfrom outsider scrutiny and discipline.7 Note also that IPO firms are riskier thanestablished firms. Therefore, to the inside-owner, the payoffs to shirking is less variablethan the payoffs to value-maximizing pursuits, which, in turn, means that riskier firms
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