Second, the effectiveness of specific organizations is undermined by an inability
to undertake coordinated action. Unity of command has been noted by Durell-
Young (1997, 23) as a ‘‘sine qua non for the successful prosecution of military
operations’’ in regard to coalition efforts, and the work of Pilster and Bo¨hmelt
(2011) note that effective interunit cooperation can only be accomplished through
joint peacetime training. Coup-fearing leaders ensure that different organizations
in the security apparatus are not experienced in coordinating. Returning to the
Zaire example, challenges to interbranch communication were so well established
that the Zairean air force accidentally bombed its own ground soldiers
just prior to Shaba I (Young and Turner 1985, 252). In terms of international
conflict, Muammar Qaddafi similarly undermined the fighting capacity of his
own forces while at war with Chad by ‘‘frequently and unexpectedly’’ rotating
command positions and division-level commands had to be created ‘‘on an ad
hoc basis in the field’’ (Pollack 2002, 386). The Libyan case indicates Qaddafi
was willing to take these coup-proofing measures while the country was already
at war. Personal survival was clearly of more importance than was state military
capabilities, and Libyan forces found ‘‘concerted’’ action to be ‘‘nearly impossible,’’
and failed to undertake a single tactical counterattack against the Chadian
army (Pollack 2002, 417).