God’s Zeal was originally written in 2007, a year that the German Ministry of
Education had declared ‘das Jahr der Geisteswissenschaften,’ or ‘the year of the moral
sciences’. As a philosopher and cultural critic, Sloterdijk took this opportunity to
advocate expanding the realm of cultural studies to encompass religious phenomena. This
book concerns many of the problems of religion previously charted by Karl Jaspers,
Schmuel Eisenstadt, and Max Weber: namely, the historical emergence of a concept of
transcendence and the resulting struggle over the symbolic order. However, Sloterdijk
approaches this material from an entirely new direction. Jaspers and the Axial Age are
referenced only twice, and this in parentheses. Instead, Sloterdijk employs a variety of
disciplinary lenses ranging from psychology to computer science. Rather than reinventing
the wheel, the result is a fresh and interesting take on religion and conflict.
Sloterdijk begins by considering possible sources of the concept of transcendence.
Drawing on David Hume and Heiner Mühlmann, he presents seven “aspects” or theories
of transcendence. Most of these explain religious ideas as “surplus phenomena” arising
from confusion about or overreaction to natural phenomena. For instance, biological
reactions to stress may appear to come from outside the individual, causing one to
postulate the existence of invisible forces inducing the reaction. This theory plays heavily
in Sloterdijk’s reading of the history of monotheistic religions, namely the stress episodes
of Passover, the Crucifixion, and the Hijra. Notably, the seventh aspect is not naturalistic
but frames the transcendent simply as “the source of revelation.” Sloterdijk acknowledges
that this theory of faith is offensive, if not dangerous, and brackets his approach with a
“blasphemy clause.”
He proceeds to describe the historical formation of the three monotheisms. The
emergence of a political order founded on transcendent revelation begins with Judaism.
Christianity then expanded this transcendent authority from a nation to a universal 2
communio. Islam continued this process with the concept of the umma. Sloterdijk
demonstrates how each new monotheism works to supplant the preceding ones. The next
chapter outlines the “battlefronts” of this conflict. Sloterdijk counts no fewer than
eighteen conflicts arising from the three monotheisms. This list includes conflicts
between religions, persecutions of pagans, internecine struggles, and the unique varieties
of atheism arising in reaction to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. He also dedicates a
chapter to “the campaigns” in which he compares and contrasts the means and strategies
by which each religion has historically maintained influence and “won” its conflicts.
The heart of the book appears in a chapter entitled “The Matrix.” Here, Sloterdijk
describes how the concept of the transcendent creates an inherent potential for destructive
zeal. The cultural matrix in which extremism arises is defined by “the rigid combination
of a monovalent ontology and a bivalent logic.” For the zealot, the transcendent (God)
may have only one interpretation. Sloterdijk describes this attitude as secundum non
datur (there is no second possibility), in reference to Aristotelian logic. Intriguingly, he
interprets the prohibition of images in Judaism and Islam as an aspect of this intolerance
of polysemy. From this ontology proceeds a worldview in which everything is interpreted
in terms of black or white, with God or against God.
In a chapter entitled “Pharmaka,” Sloterdijk observes that zealotry can never be
eliminated so long as a concept of the transcendent exists. Instead, he raises the
fascinating suggestion that zeal must be diverted into something less destructive. The
long-term goal of this “de-supremacization” is to dissolve the matrix formed by
monovalent ontology and bivalent logic. New concepts must arise that allow for the
tolerance of “grey areas” in relationship to the transcendent order. Sloterdijk finds
examples of such concepts within the history of each monotheistic tradition. In Islam,
there was the invention of the dhimmi status, in which Christian and Jewish subjects
could be tolerated under sharia law. Within Christianity, the doctrine of purgatory served
to mitigate the either/or cosmology of heaven and hell. In Judaism, the tradition of
Talmudic study fostered tolerance for multiple perspectives. From a Weberian 3
perspective, these “polyvalent” innovations represent the bureaucratization of religious
charisma. However, for Sloterdijk they symbolize hope for peace and coexistence.
The concept of “diverting” zeal is elaborated on in a chapter entitled “The
Parables of the Rings.” The title references Nathan the Wise, a play written in 1779 by
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. The story is set during the Third Crusade and emphasizes the
relativism of God and the need for cooperation between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
The three religions are symbolized by three identical rings. One ring has the magical
power to render the wearer “agreeable to God and men,” the other two are counterfeits.
Each ring-bearer then attempts to prove his ring is magical by becoming as agreeable as
possible. Competitive zeal is still present in this model, but it has been diverted into
something benign rather than open conflict. Interestingly, communism is described as
“the fourth ring.” Sloterdijk argues that the Enlightenment allowed the transcendent
potential for zeal to spill out into numerous extremist ideologies. Thus, totalizing
movements such as fascism and communism have their true roots in Western
monotheism. Similar connections have been raised by Eric Voegelin and others.
However, Sloterdijk suggests that extremist ideologies may also be diffused or diverted.
He states in his conclusion that, “Globalization means that cultures must civilize each
other.”
One key difference between Jaspers and Sloterdijk is that Jaspers attempted to
form a historical model of transcendence in light of both Asian and Western civilizations.
By contrast, Sloterdijk traces the potential for zeal directly to Judaism and, following
Freud, possibly the Egyptian cult of Aten. There are only passing references to Asian
thought. It would be interesting to see Sloterdijk’s model expanded to include, for
example, Hindu extremism. Groups like the Bharatiya Janata Party seem to possess the
same zeal Sloterdijk is describing. However, this cannot be historically traced to Western
monotheism.
God’s Zeal was originally written in 2007, a year that the German Ministry of
Education had declared ‘das Jahr der Geisteswissenschaften,’ or ‘the year of the moral
sciences’. As a philosopher and cultural critic, Sloterdijk took this opportunity to
advocate expanding the realm of cultural studies to encompass religious phenomena. This
book concerns many of the problems of religion previously charted by Karl Jaspers,
Schmuel Eisenstadt, and Max Weber: namely, the historical emergence of a concept of
transcendence and the resulting struggle over the symbolic order. However, Sloterdijk
approaches this material from an entirely new direction. Jaspers and the Axial Age are
referenced only twice, and this in parentheses. Instead, Sloterdijk employs a variety of
disciplinary lenses ranging from psychology to computer science. Rather than reinventing
the wheel, the result is a fresh and interesting take on religion and conflict.
Sloterdijk begins by considering possible sources of the concept of transcendence.
Drawing on David Hume and Heiner Mühlmann, he presents seven “aspects” or theories
of transcendence. Most of these explain religious ideas as “surplus phenomena” arising
from confusion about or overreaction to natural phenomena. For instance, biological
reactions to stress may appear to come from outside the individual, causing one to
postulate the existence of invisible forces inducing the reaction. This theory plays heavily
in Sloterdijk’s reading of the history of monotheistic religions, namely the stress episodes
of Passover, the Crucifixion, and the Hijra. Notably, the seventh aspect is not naturalistic
but frames the transcendent simply as “the source of revelation.” Sloterdijk acknowledges
that this theory of faith is offensive, if not dangerous, and brackets his approach with a
“blasphemy clause.”
He proceeds to describe the historical formation of the three monotheisms. The
emergence of a political order founded on transcendent revelation begins with Judaism.
Christianity then expanded this transcendent authority from a nation to a universal 2
communio. Islam continued this process with the concept of the umma. Sloterdijk
demonstrates how each new monotheism works to supplant the preceding ones. The next
chapter outlines the “battlefronts” of this conflict. Sloterdijk counts no fewer than
eighteen conflicts arising from the three monotheisms. This list includes conflicts
between religions, persecutions of pagans, internecine struggles, and the unique varieties
of atheism arising in reaction to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. He also dedicates a
chapter to “the campaigns” in which he compares and contrasts the means and strategies
by which each religion has historically maintained influence and “won” its conflicts.
The heart of the book appears in a chapter entitled “The Matrix.” Here, Sloterdijk
describes how the concept of the transcendent creates an inherent potential for destructive
zeal. The cultural matrix in which extremism arises is defined by “the rigid combination
of a monovalent ontology and a bivalent logic.” For the zealot, the transcendent (God)
may have only one interpretation. Sloterdijk describes this attitude as secundum non
datur (there is no second possibility), in reference to Aristotelian logic. Intriguingly, he
interprets the prohibition of images in Judaism and Islam as an aspect of this intolerance
of polysemy. From this ontology proceeds a worldview in which everything is interpreted
in terms of black or white, with God or against God.
In a chapter entitled “Pharmaka,” Sloterdijk observes that zealotry can never be
eliminated so long as a concept of the transcendent exists. Instead, he raises the
fascinating suggestion that zeal must be diverted into something less destructive. The
long-term goal of this “de-supremacization” is to dissolve the matrix formed by
monovalent ontology and bivalent logic. New concepts must arise that allow for the
tolerance of “grey areas” in relationship to the transcendent order. Sloterdijk finds
examples of such concepts within the history of each monotheistic tradition. In Islam,
there was the invention of the dhimmi status, in which Christian and Jewish subjects
could be tolerated under sharia law. Within Christianity, the doctrine of purgatory served
to mitigate the either/or cosmology of heaven and hell. In Judaism, the tradition of
Talmudic study fostered tolerance for multiple perspectives. From a Weberian 3
perspective, these “polyvalent” innovations represent the bureaucratization of religious
charisma. However, for Sloterdijk they symbolize hope for peace and coexistence.
The concept of “diverting” zeal is elaborated on in a chapter entitled “The
Parables of the Rings.” The title references Nathan the Wise, a play written in 1779 by
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. The story is set during the Third Crusade and emphasizes the
relativism of God and the need for cooperation between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
The three religions are symbolized by three identical rings. One ring has the magical
power to render the wearer “agreeable to God and men,” the other two are counterfeits.
Each ring-bearer then attempts to prove his ring is magical by becoming as agreeable as
possible. Competitive zeal is still present in this model, but it has been diverted into
something benign rather than open conflict. Interestingly, communism is described as
“the fourth ring.” Sloterdijk argues that the Enlightenment allowed the transcendent
potential for zeal to spill out into numerous extremist ideologies. Thus, totalizing
movements such as fascism and communism have their true roots in Western
monotheism. Similar connections have been raised by Eric Voegelin and others.
However, Sloterdijk suggests that extremist ideologies may also be diffused or diverted.
He states in his conclusion that, “Globalization means that cultures must civilize each
other.”
One key difference between Jaspers and Sloterdijk is that Jaspers attempted to
form a historical model of transcendence in light of both Asian and Western civilizations.
By contrast, Sloterdijk traces the potential for zeal directly to Judaism and, following
Freud, possibly the Egyptian cult of Aten. There are only passing references to Asian
thought. It would be interesting to see Sloterdijk’s model expanded to include, for
example, Hindu extremism. Groups like the Bharatiya Janata Party seem to possess the
same zeal Sloterdijk is describing. However, this cannot be historically traced to Western
monotheism.
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