The decentralization and devolution of administrative and fiscal powers to elected bodies is increasingly seen as a panacea for reforming over-centralized and unresponsive states such as Thailand Crook and Manor (1995) call this form of decentralization ‘ democratic decentralization ’ a term I have adopted in this book. Unusually for a development policy, it has won support from those on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Neo-liberals see decentralization as a means of cutting back bloated inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies while those on the left applaud its capacity to reduce state dominance by redistributing power to 'civil society'. Influential organizations such as the World Bank (1997: Chapter 7), having concluded that good governance creates the conditions for economic growth and that decentralization is one tool for creating good governance, have now endorsed democratic decentralization reforms. On now finds broadly comparable policies being implemented throughout Asia and Africa. In theory, taking fiscal and administrative control from non-elected, centrally appointed bureaucrats and giving it to elected local residents makes the development process more effective, efficient and responsive Thus, together decentralization and democratization ‘ are seen as a way of reducing the power and size of swollen central state bureaucracies, and of improving accountability for development planning and spending at a more local level' (Crook and Manor 1995: 311)