correct strategic line for the international Communist movement was no longer one of passive "peaceful coexistence" but one of active revolutionary advance. Coming at a time of frustration and sagging hopes in North Vietnam undertaking to achieve national unification by "peaceful means, this strategic estimate must have struck a responsive chord in Ho Chi Minh, who tarried a month in Peiping before returning home from the Moscow Conference. As the events of the ensuing two years were to demonstrate, Communist China and North Vietnam would act in c-oncert on the implications of this assessment
by adopting a more aggressive policy in pursuit of revolution- ary goals i n South Vietnam and Laos. As these events would also demonstrate, Idoscow's differing Strategic estimate and its reluctance t o become involved in Southeast Asia would align
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the North Vietnamese regime behind Peiping on a number of is- sues in the worsening Sino-Soviet,dispute in the latter months of 1959