In addition, these studies suggest the need to move beyond the dual
process theory's assumption that utilitarian judgments are the result of
a decrease in emotional.
Anxious attachment, by definition, implies a high degree of emotional
(specifically, anxiety in regard to interpersonal relationships), yet in
the present studies, attachment anxiety consistently predicted selecting
the utilitarian option. Thus, these studies begin to identify other variables—
beyond “emotion” and “reason”—that may steer people toward
saving the group versus saving the individual.
Furthermore, the prevailing dual-process theory of moral judgment has until
recently tended to be relatively silent regarding the moral decision
maker's larger relational context. The present data suggest that different
histories of relationship experiences lead to systematic differences in
the likelihood of endorsing the utilitarian option. Incorporating this
type of information about individuals into our understanding of their
moral judgments has important implications for future research.