a ―good of their own,‖ in the sense that they can occupy states that are better or worse for
themselves, and therefore, they have interests and needs of their own. The biosphere as a
whole, ‗Gaia,‘ and all her parts too, that is, living beings, together with collective entities,
such as ecosystems—all of these, according to deep ecologists, can be helped to further
their interests and to secure their ends, or else, they can be harmed when prevented from
fulfilling their goals (Matthews 1994, 152–154; O‘Neill 1992, 128–131).97 Mahāyāna
Buddhism, on the other hand, could take these claims to be conventionally true at most.
From the Buddhist perspective, to attempt to prove them conclusively would amount to
delusion, or attachment to views, and would constitute an impediment to realization.
As mentioned above, sometimes, deep ecologists do abstain from trying to prove
their tenets decisively and instead they merely propose identification as a way of
experiencing the world. In some places, Naess emphasized that he was not attempting to
establish the correctness of his approach, but rather, merely presenting it as a simple
invitation (Naess 1998, 201–210). Fox too, in some places, suggests that his version of
transpersonal ecology cannot be confirmed rationally, and he invites us, instead, to decide
whether to take it up or not on other criteria such as its beauty, coherence, novelty, and so
forth (Fox 1995, 216). In other words, deep ecologists occasionally seem to display little
attachment to their theories and views and, to this extent, their ideas might be reconciled
with Buddhism by taking them as conventionally and not ultimately true.
How Identification is Attained
Although identification could be grounded on conventional rather than ultimate truth,
there remains the question of how this experience is attained. Here, again, Naess‘s
philosophy and Buddhism coincide; first, awareness of suffering is described, in both
97 One might object about the appropriateness of attributing needs and interests to beings such as animals,
trees, or even forests. I shall follow John O‘Neill here and claim that it is possible to do so, on the grounds
that individual living things ―are the sorts of things that can flourish or be injured‖ and therefore they can
be said to have interests (O‘Neill 1992, 129). Moreover, this also applies to ‗higher-order‘ systems such as
species or ecosystems, which are made up of living and non-living beings too. ―It makes sense,‖ O‘Neill
explains, ―to talk of the goods of collective biological entities—colonies, ecosystems, and so on—in a way
that is irreducible to that of its members‖ (O‘Neill 1992, 131). It must be emphasized that all this belongs to
the conventional realm in Buddhism, and that in any case, recognition of these beings‘ goods does not
automatically imply that one ought to protect them (O‘Neill 1992, 132). The subject of teleology in nature
will be taken up again in the next chapter, where I shall deal with the question of purpose in evolution.
a ―good of their own,‖ in the sense that they can occupy states that are better or worse for
themselves, and therefore, they have interests and needs of their own. The biosphere as a
whole, ‗Gaia,‘ and all her parts too, that is, living beings, together with collective entities,
such as ecosystems—all of these, according to deep ecologists, can be helped to further
their interests and to secure their ends, or else, they can be harmed when prevented from
fulfilling their goals (Matthews 1994, 152–154; O‘Neill 1992, 128–131).97 Mahāyāna
Buddhism, on the other hand, could take these claims to be conventionally true at most.
From the Buddhist perspective, to attempt to prove them conclusively would amount to
delusion, or attachment to views, and would constitute an impediment to realization.
As mentioned above, sometimes, deep ecologists do abstain from trying to prove
their tenets decisively and instead they merely propose identification as a way of
experiencing the world. In some places, Naess emphasized that he was not attempting to
establish the correctness of his approach, but rather, merely presenting it as a simple
invitation (Naess 1998, 201–210). Fox too, in some places, suggests that his version of
transpersonal ecology cannot be confirmed rationally, and he invites us, instead, to decide
whether to take it up or not on other criteria such as its beauty, coherence, novelty, and so
forth (Fox 1995, 216). In other words, deep ecologists occasionally seem to display little
attachment to their theories and views and, to this extent, their ideas might be reconciled
with Buddhism by taking them as conventionally and not ultimately true.
How Identification is Attained
Although identification could be grounded on conventional rather than ultimate truth,
there remains the question of how this experience is attained. Here, again, Naess‘s
philosophy and Buddhism coincide; first, awareness of suffering is described, in both
97 One might object about the appropriateness of attributing needs and interests to beings such as animals,
trees, or even forests. I shall follow John O‘Neill here and claim that it is possible to do so, on the grounds
that individual living things ―are the sorts of things that can flourish or be injured‖ and therefore they can
be said to have interests (O‘Neill 1992, 129). Moreover, this also applies to ‗higher-order‘ systems such as
species or ecosystems, which are made up of living and non-living beings too. ―It makes sense,‖ O‘Neill
explains, ―to talk of the goods of collective biological entities—colonies, ecosystems, and so on—in a way
that is irreducible to that of its members‖ (O‘Neill 1992, 131). It must be emphasized that all this belongs to
the conventional realm in Buddhism, and that in any case, recognition of these beings‘ goods does not
automatically imply that one ought to protect them (O‘Neill 1992, 132). The subject of teleology in nature
will be taken up again in the next chapter, where I shall deal with the question of purpose in evolution.
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