A number of issues are beyond the scope of this article. First, we focus exclusively on
mandatory policies; voluntary programs as well as information disclosure programs, such as
the Toxic Release Inventory and Energy Star, are beyond our scope (for details see Tietenberg
and Wheeler 2001 and Lyon and Maxwell 2002). In addition, we concentrate on domestic
policy choice, giving relatively little attention to strictly international considerations relevant
to instrument choice or policy design (for details see Aldy and Stavins 2007 and Nordhaus
2007). Finally, our approach is largely normative: while we offer a few comments about why
certain instruments tend to have greater political success than others, we do not provide an
in-depth analysis of the (positive) political economy of environmental regulation (on this,
see Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins 1998).
A number of issues are beyond the scope of this article. First, we focus exclusively onmandatory policies; voluntary programs as well as information disclosure programs, such asthe Toxic Release Inventory and Energy Star, are beyond our scope (for details see Tietenbergand Wheeler 2001 and Lyon and Maxwell 2002). In addition, we concentrate on domesticpolicy choice, giving relatively little attention to strictly international considerations relevantto instrument choice or policy design (for details see Aldy and Stavins 2007 and Nordhaus2007). Finally, our approach is largely normative: while we offer a few comments about whycertain instruments tend to have greater political success than others, we do not provide anin-depth analysis of the (positive) political economy of environmental regulation (on this,see Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins 1998).
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