mechanisms will continue to be followed for the most part. The author believes that the
subsequent agendas and negotiations after the adoption of the ASEAN Charter vindicate the contention
that ASEAN integration is still based on vague declarations, as well as the fact that its
dispute settlement mechanism is still founded in solutions based on conciliation, mediation
and dependable offices, rather than the use of legal mechanisms like in the EU model. Historically,
inter-ASEAN disputes or arguments were resolved through diplomatic channels rather
than legal processes; therefore, the political sensitivities among the ASEAN members effectively
prevented the development of community law in ASEAN.109 The Charter therefore should
have set up a dispute settlement mechanism, perhaps similar to the one provided for in the
ASEAN Community or the ASEAN–China Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of
November 2004 to cover all ASEAN agreements rather than just the economic ones. The other
important issue is whether the private sector can go to domestic courts or supranational tribunals
at the regional level, as in the EU model. Regretfully, the ASEAN Charter did not address the issue
of private claims, and proposals to give private parties the right to seek dispute resolution were
rejected in the drafting stage. It also could have laid the groundwork for improved dispute
resolution outside the ASEAN Charter by naming a standing panel of experts to serve on
panels, establishing a code of conduct and procedure for cases and expanding the role of the
private sector. However, ASEAN leaders failed to make those endeavours. Therefore, for lack
of explicit legally binding provisions in most of its agreements, with no effective compliance
mechanisms or credible dispute settlement systems, ASEAN often does not carry out measures
already agreed on to integrate the regional economy or deal with transnational problems.