Abstract: Natural resources are neither a blessing nor a curse; intrinsically they
can neither positively nor negatively affect political and economic developments.
Rather, the negative effects of natural resources are correlated with a country’s
“structured contingency”: the existing political configuration through which the
oil revenue is managed and spent. Cambodia’s political configuration is dominated
by interlocking patron-client networks that require a leader to capture and
maintain the loyalty of key sections of the politico-commercial elite by fulfilling
their material aspirations through the distribution of perquisites. Under these conditions,
corruption is widespread, the government institutions are unresponsive,
and resources are misallocated. Examining the existing political configuration and
the precedent set by the forest and land sectors, this article argues that future oil
revenue will likely be used partly for self-enrichment of the political elites and
partly to promote political legitimacy of the ruling elites through the politics of
gift giving and patronage. The situation will likely have two significant impacts on
Cambodia: (1) inequitable development and increased income inequality and (2)
perpetuation of Cambodia’s hybrid democracy, preventing any further movement
toward democratic consolidation.
Keywords: Cambodia, democratization, natural resource curse
In this article, we analyze the politics of natural resource use and its implications
for economic development and democracy in Cambodia, examining three
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