Eighth, inter-state suspicions and rivalries among the ASEAN member states have
not been entirely eradicated by 40 years of cooperation. For example, elements of
competition and suspicion, despite the predominant pattern of cooperation, remain in
the relationship between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In such circumstances,
the principle of sovereignty is further reinforced and nationalism remains an important
element in the conduct of foreign relations. When nationalism occupies central place
in the making and the conduct of foreign policy, the notion of surrendering parts of
sovereignty to a supranational body is out of question. Giving in to regional or external
pressure, including pressure to democratize, would be politically costly. Indonesia,
already a democratizing state, remains sensitive to any attempt by external forces to
push the democratization agenda further.
Finally, the reality of geopolitics and the influence and interests of the major powers
in South East Asia serve as stumbling blocks for the promotion of the democracy
agenda in the region. This is illustrated clearly in the case of Myanmar. Even if ASEAN
decided to isolate Myanmar’s government over the lack of democratization, such a move
would be toothless in the face of Myanmar’s growing dependence on China and India.
Their strategic interests make these two major powers more
than willing to ignore the domestic problems of Myanmar
in exchange for access to energy resources – especially oil
and gas. India is reluctant to press a democracy agenda on
Myanmar for fear that such action would push Myanmar
closer to China. In such circumstances, ASEAN pressure on
Myanmar over the issue of democracy would be ineffective.
The democracy agenda envisaged by the ASC, and even in
the ASEAN Charter, is indeed a limited one. As the above analysis suggests, democracy
in ASEAN member states remains a matter of principle and a declaration of intent
rather than a concrete agenda to be pursued. However, the ASC provides a number
of entry points, albeit limited, through which the democracy building agenda could
be promoted. These entry points could in turn provide an opportunity and a basis
for further democracy building efforts in the region, and open up an opportunity for
ASEAN partners, such as the EU, to play a greater role in fostering democracy.
Even though the differences among member states regarding the nature of democracy
serve as a major constraint on the democracy building process, the universal nature of
human rights and good governance could serve as an entry point for such an agenda. The
ASC clearly envisages that the implementation of the democracy agenda should start
with the promotion of human rights and good governance
rather than an attempt to transform the political systems
of member states. ASEAN is in the process of establishing
an ASEAN Human Rights Body. By focusing on the need
to cooperate on some aspects of the promotion of human
rights and good governance, ASEAN – or those member
states with an interest – could rescue some of the democracy
agenda.
The ASC also includes other agendas which, if implemented,
could contribute to the process of democracy building in the region. Pathways to
promoting democracy in South East Asia should not be confined to the measures
listed under ‘political development’ in the ASCPA. Nor should the ASEAN democracy